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Articles
The Voting Rights Act and the
Racial Gap in Lost Votes
PAUL MOKE* AND RICHARD B. SAPHIRE**
The vote is the most powerful instrument ever devised by man for
breaking down injustice and destroying the terrible walls which
imprison men because they are different.
-Lyndon Baines Johnson'
INTRODUCTION
Recent presidential and gubernatorial elections have exposed
serious flaws in the process by which American voters participate in the
democratic franchise. In a number of jurisdictions throughout the
country, the number of "lost" or "residual votes"-votes discarded due
to machine error or intentional or unintentional voter behavior-has
exceeded the difference between the two major candidates, casting doubt
on the legitimacy of such elections.2 Studies of residual votes and election
technology demonstrate that when voters use punch cards, a racial gap
occurs in the number of residual votes cast: African-Americans who use
punch cards are more likely than non-African-Americans to be
* Professor of Social and Political Studies, Wilmington College.
** Professor of Law, University of Dayton School of Law.
Research on this Article was supported, in part, by a research grant from the University of
Dayton School of Law. Thanks go to Dan Conkle for his helpful comments on an earlier draft.
i. Lyndon B. Johnson, President of the United States, Remarks in the Capitol Rotunda at the
Signing of the Voting Rights Act (Aug. 6, 1965), http://www.lbjlib.utexas.edu/johnson/archives.hom/
speeches.hom/65o8o6.asp.
2. See sources cited infra note i9. In addition to the razor-thin contest between Bush and Gore
in Florida during the 2000 presidential election, see Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000), the race between
Democratic candidate Christine Gregoire and Republican Dino Rossi in the Washington
gubernatorial election in the fall of 2004 was decided by 129 votes out of 2.8 million cast, see Sarah
Kershaw, Trial Begins in Washington over Election for Governor, N.Y. TtMES, May 24, 2005, at A13.
Rossi subsequently filed a legal challenge concerning this election. Id. The trial court rejected this
challenge and Rossi decided not to appeal. See Eli Sanders, Judge Dismisses Lawsuit Over Washington
Election, N.Y. TMES. June 7, 2005, at AI6.
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disenfranchised because of unintentional errors in the use of voting
equipment.3 In contrast, when voters use equipment that notifies them of
possible overvoting and undervoting errors, the racial gap is significantly
curtailed.4
Following the disputed 2000 presidential election, several civil rights
and civil liberties organizations used section 2 of the Voting Rights Act,
in conjunction with the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution, to challenge state voting technology, arguing that punch
card equipment has an adverse impact on racial minorities Most of
these lawsuits follow the same pattern. First, plaintiffs allege that
African-American voters are more likely than whites to live in counties
that use voting equipment which does not provide notice of possible
voting mistakes, and that this leads to higher levels of voter
disenfranchisement.6 Second, they contend that even when African-
Americans use the same non-notice equipment as other voters, they are
far more likely than non-African-Americans to be disenfranchised.7
3. See sources cited infra notes 31-33, 257. Because nationwide empirical data on residual voting
rates among Hispanic voters is largely unavailable, specific analysis of this dimension of the issue is
beyond the scope of this Article.
4. See infra notes 257-60. Voting equipment notifies voters of possible errors in various ways.
Electronic systems feature flashing lights if there is an undervote, and a mechanical block makes it
impossible to overvote. On precinct-count optical scan equipment, a vote tabulator will return the
ballot to the voter if there is an overvote, and voters thereby receive an opportunity to correct their
ballots. The term "notice voting equipment" also is known in the literature as "second-chance voting."
For specific descriptions of how electronic and optical scan systems operate, see Daniel P. Tokaji, The
Paperless Chase: Electronic Voting and Democratic Values, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1711, 1717-24 (2005);
see also HENRY E. BRADY ET AL., COUNTING ALL THE VOTES: THE PERFORMANCE OF VOTING TECHNOLOGY
IN THE USA (2001), http://ucdata.berkeley.edu:71oi/newweb/countingallthevotes.pdf.
5. These organizations included the NAACP, the ACLU, and Common Cause. There were five
major cases filed throughout the country, including Stewart v. Blackwell, 356 F. Supp. 2d 791 (N.D.
Ohio 2004), rev'd, 444 F.3d 843 (6th Cir. 2006); Common Cause v. Jones, 213 F. Supp. 2d 1io6 (C.D.
Cal. 2002); Black v. McGuffage, 2O9 F. Supp. 2d 889 (N.D. Ill. 2002); NAACP v. Harris, No. oi-CIV-
120 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 10, 2001), available at http://www.aclufl.org/legislativecourts/
legal-department/briefs/complaints/naacp-v harris.cfm: and Andrews v. Cox, No oi-CV-o318 (N.D.
Ga. Jan. 5, 2oos), available at http://electionzooo.stanford.edu/aclu.cox.pdf.
6. This allegation was made in the litigation in Illinois, Black, 209 F. Supp. 2d at 892, and in
California, Jones, 213 F. Supp. 2d at Iio7-o8. In Black, the plaintiffs argued, inter alia, that Illinois's
system of voting technology discriminated against minority voters in violation of section 2 of the
Voting Rights Act. 209 F. Supp. 2d at 892. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the Voting Rights
Act claim, but the court denied this motion. Id. at 897. However, it granted the defendants' motion to
dismiss with respect to the plaintiffs' Fourteenth Amendment Privileges and Immunities Clause claim.
Id. at 902.
In Jones, a number of public interest organizations and California residents filed suit to
require the California Secretary of State to de-certify punch card voting equipment that voters used in
nine counties. 213 F. Supp. 2d at I I07-o8. The defendants subsequently filed a motion for judgment on
the pleadings, which the court denied. Id. at I I To. Following a settlement, the trial court determined
that it was feasible for the nine counties to convert to other certified equipment by the March 2004
primary election. Common Cause v. Jones, No. 01-03470 SVW(RZX), 2002 WL 1766436, at "I (C.D.
Cal. Feb. 14, 2002).
7. This allegation was made in the Ohio case, Stewart, 356 F. Supp. 2d at 795. This suit challenges
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The allegation that African-American voters are more likely than
non-African-Americans to use inferior voting equipment rests upon the
unique circumstances of a given state or electoral jurisdiction. In two of
the leading voting technology cases, one in Illinois' and one in
California,9 plaintiffs made this allegation. Nevertheless, at least one
major academic study concludes that nationwide, African-Americans and
non-African-Americans are equally likely to have access to voting
equipment that provides notice of overvoting and undervoting errors."
Thus, in many parts of the country, challenges against racial disparities in
residual votes necessarily must involve only the second allegation-that
even when all racial groups use the same non-notice equipment, African-
Americans suffer a disproportionate likelihood of disenfranchisement.
Using the Voting Rights Act to challenge this aspect of the voting
process represents a new and untested dimension of voting rights law,
and in this Article we examine its problems and its prospects.
We organize our inquiry into three parts. Initially, in Part I, we
explore the empirical evidence concerning voting technology, residual
votes, and the disenfranchisement of African-American voters. A review
of this evidence and the relevant scholarship leads us to conclude that
African-Americans who use inferior punch card voting technology are at
a disproportionate risk of casting residual votes. Proving this allegation
in court, however, can be a daunting proposition. In part, this occurs
because the use of aggregate data to construct models of voting behavior
by race raises difficult methodological issues. These issues make
extensive demands on attorneys and judges in voting rights cases as they
confront and try to master the unfamiliar world of social science
methodology. We conclude Part I by providing an overview of these
methodological issues.
In Part II, we analyze several cases challenging a variety of voting
practices under section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. In this section, we
explore the legislative history of the Act, and several leading vote denial
and vote dilution decisions, with the goal of developing a legal
framework for voting technology cases under section 2. Based upon a
review of the case law in voter purge, exclusive franchise, and felon
disenfranchisement decisions, we argue that the causation element under
Ohio's simultaneous use of error and non-error notification voting equipment under the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution and section 2 of the federal Voting Rights Act of 1965.
Id. The suit was brought by the ACLU of Ohio and the ACLU Voting Rights Project. The authors
serve as co-counsel for the plaintiffs. The views expressed in this Article about the Stewart litigation
are those of the authors, and not necessarily those of the ACLU or any of the litigants in Stewart.
8. Black, 209 F. Supp. 2d at 889.
9. Jones, 213 F. Supp. 2d at iio7-o8.
io. Stephen Knack & Martha Kropf, Who Uses Inferior Voting Technology?, 35 PS: POL. SCI. &
POL. 541, 541 (2002).
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section 2 is an area of significant uncertainty. The causation element
requires plaintiffs to show that the voting discrimination in question
arises "on account of race." Currently, there are two competing and
mutually exclusive approaches to this requirement, the dispositive force
test" and the external factor test. 2 The first test requires plaintiffs to
show that the challenged electoral procedure is the dispositive force in
depriving minorities of equal participation in the political process,'3
whereas the second one holds that the disparate racial impact can arise
from factors external to the challenged voting mechanism itself.4 Based
on our reading of the legislative history, we argue that the choice
between these two approaches should reflect Congress's paramount goal
of prohibiting electoral practices that magnify social and historical
discrimination in the broader society. In this sense, the external factor
test is most congruent with Congress's goals for section 2, and
accordingly, we use it in our framework for challenging voting
technology under section 2.
In Part III, we undertake an examination of several recent voting
technology cases, including Stewart v. Blackwell,5 the only such case
since the 2000 presidential election that has been decided on the merits.
Using principles developed in Parts I and II of this Article, we analyze
the expert evidence submitted by both sides on the section 2 issue in
Stewart, and apply this analysis to critique the trial court's decision.
We conclude by offering several justifications for why the racial gap
in lost votes should be actionable under section 2 of the Voting Rights
Act. Empirically, non-notice voting systems represent facially neutral
voting practices that have racially discriminatory results, and as a matter
of causation, a direct link exists between the voting practices and the
disenfranchisement of disproportionate numbers of African-American
voters. I6 The legislative history of the Voting Rights Act indicates a
congressional preference for an "inclusionary" approach to political
participation, 7 in contrast to the "merit-based" vision of democracy that
the Supreme Court apparently favors.'" And, for reasons we develop,
Congress's recent efforts at voting technology reform in the Help
America Vote Act will not solve the underlying problem. We conclude
that these circumstances warrant an active judicial role in voting
ii. For an example of this approach, see Ortiz v. Philadelphia, 824 F. Supp. 514, 525-26 (E.D. Pa.
1993), aff'd, 28 F.3d 3o6 (3d Cir. I994).
12. For an example of this approach, see Farrakhan v. Washington, 338 F.3d lOO9, IOl 1-12 (9th
Cir. 2003).
13. See, e.g., Ortiz, 824 F. Supp. at 825-26.
14. See, e.g., Farrakhan, 338 F.3d at 10 11-12.
15. 356 F. Supp. 2d (N.D. Ohio 2004), rev'd, 444 F.3 d 843 (6th Cir. 2oo6).
I6. See infra Part I.
17. See infra Part II.C.
I8. See infra note 237 and accompanying text.
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technology challenges under section 2.
I. THE SOCIAL SCIENCE EVIDENCE
A. RESIDUAL VOTING, ELECTION TECHNOLOGY, AND RACE
The 2000 presidential election and its aftermath have drawn
attention to the problem of voting technology and residual balloting.'9
When voters go to the polls, they can cast residual votes in a variety of
ways. First, they can vote for more than the permissible number of
candidates in a given contest, thereby casting an overvote. Alternatively,
they can cast no vote for a given contest, or in the case of elections
involving multiple officeholders, such as at-large elections for county
boards of commissioners, they can undervote by casting fewer than the
permissible number of votes.
Studies of voting technology have demonstrated that different forms
of voting equipment yield different degrees of accuracy in translating
voter intentions into a form that computerized vote-tabulating
equipment can read."° Punch card systems generally are associated with
the highest levels of residual balloting, especially in presidential elections
at the top of the ballot.' Electronic and optical scan systems that warn
voters when they are about to cast overvotes or undervotes reduce the
levels of residual voting by almost one half." Voters using punch card
systems, and especially the Votomatic system, likely find it difficult to
check the accuracy of their work,23 and the holes they punch into the
ballot make it physically unstable and susceptible to having loose chads
i9. See, e.g., Michael C. Herron & Jasjeet S. Sekhon, Overvoting and Representation: An
Examination of Overvoted Presidential Ballots in Broward and Miami-Dade Counties, 22 ELECTORAL
STUD. 21 (2003). The literature on balloting equipment and residual voting is extensive. For analysis of
what types of voters experience problems with residual voting, see id.; D.E. "Betsy" Sinclair & R.
Michael Alvarez, Who Overvotes, Who Undervotes, Using Punchcards? Evidence from Los Angeles
County, 57 POL. RES. Q. 15 (2004); Michael Tomz & Robert P. Van Houweling, How Does Voting
Equipment Affect the Racial Gap in Voided Ballots?, 47 AM. J. POL. SCI. 46 (2003). For more general
analysis of the problem of residual voting, see BRADY ET AL., supra note 4; CALTECH/MIT VOTING
TECHNOLOGY PROJECT, VOTING: WHAT IS, WHAT COULD BE (200I), http://www.vote.caltech.edu/media/
documents/julyoI/Julyo IVTPVotingReportEntire.pdf.
20. For an overview of the various types of voting equipment used in American elections and the
problems associated with each, see Tokaji, supra note 4. For more specific analysis of common
mistakes that voters make on each system, see BRADY ET AL., supra note 4, at 1O, 12.
21. Roy SALTMAN, NATL. BUREAU OF STANDARDS, ACCURACY, INTEGRITY, AND SECURITY IN
COMPUTERIZED VOTE-TALLYING (1988), available at http://www.itl.nist.gov/lab/specpubs/5oo-158.htm.
22. CALTECH/MIT VOTING TECHNOLOGY PROJECT, supra note 19, at I7.
23. See SALTMAN, supra note 21 at I 188-89. The Votomatic punch card system features a booklet
containing candidates and issues, as well as a ballot with numbers and pre-scored chads that
correspond to the available choices. Tokaji, supra note 4. Voters use a stylus to punch through the
ballot card in a location corresponding to the number of the desired candidate. Id. In contrast, the
Datavote punch card system features a ballot that contains the names of the candidates and issues, and
voters do not need to transfer their choices from the booklet to the ballot card. Id. This eliminates one
possible source of voter error.
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fall out on repeated runs through tabulation equipment. 4
Another dimension of the literature focuses on which types of voters
are most likely to encounter problems with residual voting. These studies
use a variety of methodologies to trace the impact of voting technology
by race, gender, and party affiliation. 5 The tacit assumption of such
studies is that persons who take the trouble to go to the polling place and
wait in line to cast their votes are unlikely to spoil their ballots
deliberately. Although this assumption is reasonable, it is subject to two
caveats. First, if voters lack sufficient information to make an informed
choice, they may intentionally undervote for a given contest. At the top
of the ballot, intentional undervoting is rare, in part because media
attention given to candidates running in salient contests, such as those for
president or governor, makes it more likely that voters will know what
their preference is.26 Exit polls and post-election surveys also show that
there is virtually no racial gap in the level of intentional undervoting in
these contests." But as voters go down-ballot, it is likely that they will
know less about the issues and candidates, resulting in a decision to "sit
out" those contests. The second caveat is that apathetic or alienated
voters may deliberately spoil their ballots due either to indifference or as
a means of political protest2
8
Several forms of non-punch card voting technology physically
prevent overvotes. 9 These include electronic equipment ("Digital
Recording Electronic" (DRE) devices) and precinct-count optical scan
systems.3" Thus, voters who are at risk of disenfranchisement through
overvoting, such as those who are alienated or simply careless, will not be
able to cast overvotes at all when they use this type of equipment. In
contrast, those who intend to cast undervotes may ignore warnings and
simply leave their ballots blank. Therefore, because some undervotes are
intentional and virtually no overvotes are, studying overvotes provides a
better test of the extent to which voting technology makes a difference in
24. Although full consideration of this issue is beyond the scope of this Article, we have
addressed it more extensively in previous published work. See Richard B. Saphire & Paul Moke,
Litigating Bush v. Gore in the States: Dual Voting Systems and the Fourteenth Amendment, 51 VILL. L.
REV. 260 (2006). For further discussion of this issue, see SALTMAN, supra note 21, at 1188-89.
25. See, e.g., sources cited supra note I9.
26. Stephen Knack & Martha Kropf, Roll-Off at the Top of the Ballot: Intentional Undervoting in
American Presidential Elections, POL. & POL'Y 575, 580 (2oo3). This research is based on survey data
from the Voter News Service and National Elections Studies, which showed that the level of
intentional undervoting at the top of the ballot ranges between .24% and .77% of all residual votes. Id.
27. Id.
28. See Wolgang Hircazy, The Impact of Mandatory Voting Laws on Turnout: A Quasi-
Experimental Approach, 13 ELECTORAL STUD. 64 (1994); Sinclair & Alvarez, supra note I9, at 15, I6;
Rodney P. Stiefbold, The Significance of Void Ballots in West German Elections, 59 Am. POL. Sc. REV.
391 (1965).
29. See Tokaji, supra note 4, at 1721-23.
30. Id.
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translating voter preferences into electoral outcomes.
Official reports and a variety of scholarly studies of the 2000 general
election show that African-American voters, as well as persons of lower
socioeconomic status, are more likely to cast residual votes than white,
more affluent voters.' This finding has been verified in studies of several
Florida counties, including Palm Beach, Broward and Miami-Dade,32 as
well as research on selected congressional districts and states throughout
the country.33 Although most of the Florida studies feature precinct-level
analysis, other studies are limited because they are based on county-level
or congressional district analysis, which contains large amounts of
aggregation bias-statistical errors that occur when aggregate data is
used to draw inferences about individuals. One painstaking study of
overvoting in Florida reached two conclusions: (I) precincts with large
numbers of African-Americans, Hispanics, registered Democrats, or
persons of lower socioeconomic status have relatively high presidential
overvoting rates; and (2) presidential overvoting and undervoting
correlates with residual voting in down-ballot electoral contests.34
Another study, based on data from South Carolina and Louisiana in the
2000 presidential election, found lower levels of residual voting and
substantial reductions in the racial gap when voters use notice voting
equipment.3" The reliability of this study is enhanced because these are
the only two states in the nation in which voters indicate their race as
part of the voter registration process, thus eliminating one possible
source of error that arises from estimating voter turn-out by race.
31. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ELECTIONS: STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF FACTORS THAT
AFFECTED UNCOUNTED VOTES IN THE 2000 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION (2001), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/do2I22.pdf; see also Herron & Sekhon, supra note i9; Sinclair &
Alvarez, supra note 19, at 24; and Tomz & Van Houweling, supra note 19.
32. Bruce E. Hanson, Recounts From Undervotes: Evidence From the 2000 Presidential Election,
98 J. AM. STAT. Ass'N 292, 296; Herron & Sekhon, supra note t9. Several other studies also examined
other counties in Florida. See U.S. COMM. ON CIVIL RIGHTS, VOTING IRREGULARITIES IN FLORIDA DURING
THE 2000 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION (2001), available at http://www.usccr.gov/
pubsvote2oo/report/main.htm; see also RICHARD A. POSNER, BREAKING THE DEADLOCK: THE 2000
ELECTION, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE COURTS (2001).
33. MINORITY STAFF OF H.R. COMM. ON GOV'T REFORM, INCOME AND RACIAL DISPARITIES IN THE
UNDERCOUNT IN THE 2000 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 2-3 (2001), avaliable at http://www.house.gov/
roybal-allard/undercountreport.pdf; see also Knack & Kropf, supra note Io.
34. Herron & Sekhon, supra note 19. This finding squares with the conclusions of a study of the
1996 presidential election, which concluded that counties with relatively large black and Hispanic
populations also had relatively high rates of presidential undervoting and overvoting. Steven Knack &
Martha Kropf, Voided Ballots in the 1996 Presidential Election: A County-Level Analysis, 65 J. POL.
881 (2003).
35. Tomz & Van Houweling, supra note 19. While regional studies, such as those in Florida or
California, have found that African-American voters are less likely to have access to notice forms of
voting technology than whites, see, e.g., sources cited supra note 32 and accompanying text, one
national study based on county-level data from 39 states did not confirm this finding, see Knack &
Kropf, supra note Io, at 541.
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Other recent scholarship stresses the race of the candidates in
determining the extent of the racial gap in residual voting.: One study
focused on the 1998 general election in Cook County, Illinois in which
voters used punch card equipment. These elections included high-profile
contests for both U.S. Senate and Illinois Secretary of State in which one
candidate was African-American. They estimated that the African-
American residual vote rate was less than half of what it was when only
white candidates were on the ballot.37 This suggests that residual voting is
discretionary and that African-Americans may abstain in contests
involving only white candidates due to apathy or uncertainty about the
candidates' policy preferences.
But our own research on overvoting with Votomatic punch cards in
the City of Cincinnati mayoral election and the concurrent, multi-
candidate Cincinnati City Council election of 2001 casts doubt on this
hypothesis. These elections featured African-American candidates for
both offices, and they occurred seven months after major riots erupted
over the issue of police use of deadly force, at a time when racial tension
in the city ran high. Although the racial gap in overvoting in the mayoral
election indeed was quite small, it increased substantially in the at-large
city council election. Significantly, the precincts that experienced the
highest level of overvoting in the 2000 presidential election often were
the same ones with the most overvoting in the city council election, and
these precincts were heavily African-American. This suggests that
overvoting may not be intentional and that accidental behavior that is
linked to voting equipment may be of continuing significance.
A final theme in the literature consists of studies that examine
residual voting across all precincts in one election jurisdiction to
determine if voting mistakes are randomly distributed across the
36. E.g., Michael C. Herron & Jasjeet S. Sekhon, Black Candidates and Black Votes: Assessing the
Impact of Candidate Race on Uncounted Vote Rates, 67 J. POL. 154 (2005).
37- Id.
38. The 2001 Cincinnati mayoral election featured a popular black television news anchor,
Courtis Fuller, who ran against a white incumbent, Charlie Luken. Patrick Crowley, The Race for
Mayor, CINCINNATn ENQ., Oct. 28, 2001, at IA. In the city council race, voters selected nine persons
from a list of twenty-one candidates; fifteen of these candidates were black. Robert Anglen,
Newcomer Pepper is First, CINCINNATI ENQ., Nov. 7, 2001, at rB. The authors' own analysis of the
mayoral race showed a steep decline in the percentage of overvotes, and the correlation between
overvoting in the 2000 presidential election by precinct and overvoting in the 2001 mayoral race was
relatively weak (R=.2o8, p<.ot). Paul Moke, Analysis of 200 Cincinatti Mayoral Election Data
(unpublished analysis, on file with author). Yet the city council race showed a significant increase in
the percentage of overvotes, and the correlation between overvoting in the 2000 presidential election
and overvoting in the 2001 city council race was strong (R=.545, p<.oi). Id. Although the increase in
overvoting may have been a function of voter confusion concerning how many candidates they could
vote for, notice voting equipment would better inform voters of this fact. Due to complexities in the
measurement of undervoting in a multi-candidate race, no analysis of undervoting in the city council
race was undertaken.
[VoI. 58:1
THE RACIAL GAP IN LOST VOTES
population when the type of voting system is held constant. A recent
study of residual voting in the County of Los Angeles in the 2000 general
election, where all voters used Votomatic punchcards, showed that race,
gender, party registration, and ballot language all had an impact on the
level of overvoting and undervoting.39 The authors hypothesized that
over and undervotes are related to "voter sophistication and
connectedness with the political system," which suggests that in addition
to race and ethnicity, socioeconomic status, gender, and primary
language variables are important. The authors also found that the highest
levels of overvoting occurred at the top of the ballot in the presidential
and United States Senate elections, while the highest levels of
undervoting occurred in the down-ballot elections. Hispanics and
African-Americans were substantially more likely to cast both overvotes
and undervotes than were non-minorities.40
Collectively, these findings confirm that there is a racial gap in
residual voting-particularly with respect to overvotes-that is
associated with punch card technology. Although there is a general
consensus on this proposition among social scientists, some areas of
disagreement still remain, including on methodological issues. Since
conflicts over methodology often arise in battles between experts at trial,
particularly in voting rights cases,42 this is a matter worth exploring in
detail.
B. METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES AND THE RACIAL GAP
Voting rights cases often present daunting challenges for legal
professionals. The highly complicated, mathematical nature of the
evidence requires attorneys and judges to delve into subject matter that
few undergraduate courses of study examine and that most law schools
simply do not address. The methods of disaggregation that statisticians
use to estimate voting behavior by race often go to the essence of the
plaintiffs' proof in such cases. Yet, frequently attorneys and judges are
no better equipped than members of the lay public to follow the nuances
of these procedures, which is to say that they often are not very well
equipped at all. As many jurists have remarked, understanding the
39. Sinclair & Alvarez, supra note 19, at 23.
40. id.
41. Most studies of residual voting conclude that the racial gap is more pronounced with respect
to overvoting than it is for undervoting. See, e.g., Herron & Sekhon, supra note 19. Our own research
on residual voting in Ohio squares with these findings. See supra note 38. Accordingly, the emphasis in
this Article will be on overvoting rather than undervoting or the combination of both.
42. See, e.g., Garza v. County of Los Angeles, 918 F.2d 763, 773 (9th Cir. 199o). For a discussion
and analysis of the conflicts between the experts who testified for the plaintiffs and defendants in that
case, see generally David A. Freedman et al., Ecological Regression and Voting Rights, 15 EVALUATION
REV. 672 (1991); Allan J. Lichtman, Passing the Test: Ecological Regression Analysis in the Los Angeles
County Case and Beyond, 15 EVALUATION REV. 770 (1991).
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strengths and weaknesses of social science methods represents one of the
more daunting aspects of trying a voting rights case.43
The gatekeeping role that the Supreme Court has assigned to federal
trial courts in assessing the scientific validity of proffered expert
testimony and conclusions' makes it imperative that judges and
attorneys grasp the nuances of these methodologies. Yet in this area of
the law, as in many others, the extent to which the legal community has
mastered the relevant principles of statistics and scientific methodology is
an open question. Recently, several scholars have noted the conflict that
arises when scientific culture intersects with the culture of the
courtroom.45 The work of science proceeds by hypothesis testing,
statistical measurement, replication, and an underlying skepticism about
ultimate truth. In contrast, the work of the law proceeds by means of
"binary (yes/no) judgments" concerning witness credibility, prima facie
case development, and the overall burden of proof, in an effort to arrive
at what is often a moral judgment concerning truth.46 Despite the growing
importance of statistics and natural and social science in such areas as
medical malpractice, products liability, environmental law, and criminal
law, relatively few legal professionals are comfortable with empirical
methodologies, and for their part, lower court judges often have little
time to invest in acquiring new knowledge in this area. 7 In these
circumstances, it is foreseeable that courts will issue decisions that reflect
a flawed understanding of empirical methodology.
43. For example, as Judge Porfilio noted, in the context of expert testimony concerning racial
bloc voting:
We are wary of the interplay between these statistical proofs arising as they do from
disciplines foreign to the methodology of the bench and our usual approach to judicial
resolutions. "This concern has grown with the realization that the esoterics of econometrics
and statistics which both parties have required this court to judge have a centripetal
dynamic of their own. They push from the outside roles of tools for judicial decisions
toward the core of decision making itself." Without the exercise of care, these esoterica
could transfer the decisional process from the courts to social scientists.
Sanchez v. Colorado, 97 F.3d 1303, 1313 n.15 (1oth Cir. 1996) (citing In re Fibreboard Corp., 893 F.2d
706, 710 (5th Cir. i99o)).
44. See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 141 (1999); Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522
U.S. 136, 138-39 (997); Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 589 (993).
45. See David L. Faigman, The Law's Scientific Revolution: Reflections and Ruminations on the
Law's Use of Experts in Year Seven of the Revolution, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 661, 667-68 (2000);
Michelle M. Mello, Using Statistical Evidence to Prove the Malpractice Standard of Care: Bridging
Legal, Clinical, and Statistical Thinking, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 821, 825 (2002).
46. Mello, supra note 45, at 828.
47. See Faigman, supra note 45. Over the past several years, the Federal Judicial Center has
provided judges with additional statistical training. See, e.g., David H. Kaye & David A. Freedman,
Reference Guide on Statistics, in FED. JUDICIAL CTR., REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 85(2d ed. 2000). Notwithstanding the importance of improving judges' understanding of empirical
methods, several recent articles have criticized judicial opinions in the voting rights area that feature a
single-minded focus on quantitative evidence to the exclusion of qualitative evaluation and contextual
analysis. See, e.g., Heather K. Gerken, Morgan Kousser's Noble Dream, 99 MicH. L. REV. 1298, 1302
(2001).
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Studies of voting behavior and race face additional challenges. As a
general rule, most voting research is conducted after the actual election
by examining aggregate voting data by precinct."8 This methodology rules
out experimental research designs that might shed light on causal
relationships and forces researchers to frame conclusions about
individual voter behavior from aggregate precinct, ward, or even county
data. Because forty-eight out of the fifty states do not gather data on the
race of voters, either at the time of registration or at the polling place,49 it
must be estimated through methods that contain problematic
assumptions. Relevant census data concerning the voting age population
are presented according to block or block group residence, classifications
that may not square with precinct geography."0 Challenges to election
technology also must contend with the fact that voter behavior and
intentions in the polling place are private. Researchers cannot observe or
inquire directly into what voters are intending as they cast overvotes or
undervotes. Occasionally, data from exit polls shed some light on this
question, but such polls are expensive and somewhat rare." Finally, many
jurisdictions do not keep separate statistics on overvotes and undervotes,
and in such instances, researchers must examine residual votes only in
the aggregate by subtracting the total votes cast for a given office from
the number of ballots cast.
Urban geographers, social scientists, and historians have devised a
variety of methods to overcome the problem of estimating individual
behavior from aggregate voting statistics. All are based on a specific set
of assumptions which relate to the context and the specific problem to
which they are being applied. Demographic data on race and ethnicity
are available from the U.S. Census Bureau's decennial census. 2 Because
census data provide a snapshot of the population at a particular point in
time, applying this picture to a subsequent election introduces error since
the population may have changed in the meantime. The incongruity
between precincts and census blocks can be solved by means of an
estimation procedure that uses mapping software to allocate the
48. See, e.g., Sinclair & Alvarez, supra note i9, at 16.
49. See Tomz & Van Houweling, supra note 19, at 50.
50. For example, precinct geography in Ohio did not match census blocks until a series of reforms
were made in the late 199os. Expert Report of Mark Sailing at I, Stewart v. Blackwell, 356 F. Supp. 2d
791 (N.D. Ohio 2004) (No. 5:02 CV 2028). However, even as recently as the 2ooo election, many urban
counties in the state did not use precinct boundaries that were coextensive with census blocks. Id.
51. Exit polls on residual balloting in presidential elections illustrate this point. E.g., Knack &
Kropf, supra note 26, at 578-79. Although the Voter News Service conducted exit polls in every
presidential election from 198o forward, in only one such election did researchers ask voters if they
intentionally undervoted in the presidential election. Id. For further analysis of this issue, see id.
52. U.S. Census Bureau, Census 2000 Summary File, http://factfinder.census.gov
/servlet/DownloadDatasetServlet?_lang:en (follow Census 2oo Summary Files hyperlink). The census
redistricting database is available at http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/
DownloadDatasetServlet?_lang:en (follow Census 2ooo Redistricting Data hyperlink).
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population of the block into separate precincts. Two alternative ways to
approach this task are the centroid and area proportionment methods.
The centroid method assigns all of the block population to the precinct
containing the geographic center of the block, while the area
proportionment method assigns the block population to the different
precincts based on the percentage of block area that is located in each. 3
Most urban geographers conclude that the area proportionment method
is the more accurate of the two approaches, 4 but this may vary
depending on the precise configuration of dwellings and population in a
given area.
Another dimension of this subject matter concerns the gathering of
data on other variables of interest. Some researchers have explored the
relationship between overvoting and political party orientation by
analyzing electronic images of all ballots cast.5 Others have relied upon
data from states that record the voter's race as part of the registration
process, thus eliminating the need to estimate this crucial variable. 6 But
researchers seeking to replicate these findings in other elections or other
jurisdictions may find that these approaches are of limited utility. Only
rarely will media or foundations provide sufficient funds for the creation
of electronic ballot images of all ballots in disputed elections, and the
vast majority of states do not gather data on race as part of the voter
registration process. As a result, plaintiffs must use different
methodologies to overcome the "ecological fallacy" of using aggregate
data to draw inferences about individual voter behavior.57
There are three ways to address this fallacy. The first, known as
homogeneous precinct analysis, examines voting data from precincts that
are 90% black or 90% white, as a means of estimating the racial behavior
in question. 8 The second approach, ecological regression, employs a
regression methodology that uses data from all precincts or counties in a
jurisdiction to arrive at a point estimate and a regression line of voting
53. See R. Flowerdew & M. Green, Data Integration: Statistical Methods for Transferring Data
between Zonal Systems, in HANDLING GEOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION: METHODOLOGY AND POTENTIAL
APPLICATIONS 38,42-44 (Ian Masser & Michael Blackmore eds., 1991).
54. See id.
55. See Herron & Sekhon, supra note 19. The researchers conducted this analysis on all ballots
cast in Broward and Miami-Dade counties in Florida in the 2000 general election. See id.
56. Tomz & Van Houweling, supra note 19, at 5o. Knowing this information avoids the necessity
of assuming that voter turn-out does not vary by race or of estimating voter turn-out by race through
Monte Carlo random selection. For further discussion of this issue, see the description of the King
ecological inference procedure in the Methodological Appendix, infra.
57. The antithesis of the ecological fallacy is known as the contextual fallacy. See CHRISTOPHER W.
ACHEN & W. PHILLIPS SHIVELY, CROSS-LEVEL INFERENCE 219-23 (1995). It occurs when individual-level
information such as a person's political party affiliation is used to draw conclusions about the
neighborhood in which she lives. Id.
58. Because of the technical complexity of several of the analytical methods discussed here, we
offer a more complete analysis of each in the Methodological Appendix, infra.
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behavior by race." The third approach is Gary King's ecological
inference.6'
Both ecological regression and ecological inference use a statistical
method known as regression to estimate the relationship between race
and voting behavior. Regression is based on an error statistic known as
proportionate reduction in error, which indicates how well knowledge of
one or more variables improves the prediction of a second variable .6,
Regression makes it possible to test the strength of the relationship
between the research variables, using a statistic that is known as the
coefficient of determination, or "R-squared. ' '62 This indicates the
percentage of total variation in the dependent variable that is
attributable to its linear relationship to the independent variable. The
slope of each regression line, which is known in the literature as a partial
regression coefficient, indicates the amount of increase or decrease in the
dependent variable for each one-unit difference in the independent
variable."
Because there is much confusion in the legal community concerning
the meaning and application of these concepts, especially as they relate
to voting rights cases, we will briefly examine some of the most common
problems here. First, linear regression is based on several assumptions,
and, depending on the nature of the data, measures of association take
different forms." As it applies to voting cases, this means that regression
equations that combine different types of measurement, such as the
percentage of African-American voters in a precinct and whether a given
candidate has a history of committing scandal in office, must incorporate
alternative regression techniques. 66
A second and deeper problem concerns correlation between two or
59. See Methodological Appendix, infra.
6o. Id.; see also GARY KING, A SOLUTION TO THE ECOLOGICAL INFERENCE PROBLEM:
RECONSTRUCTING INDIVIDUAL BEHAVIOR FROM AGGREGATE DATA 4 (1997).
61. R. MARK SIRKIN, STATISTICS FOR THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 445-46 (2006).
62. Id.
63. DUNCAN CRAMER & DENNIS HowITr, THE SAGE DICTIONARY OF STATISTICS 159 (2004).
64. These assumptions include: (I) the observations are independent; (2) the relationship
between the two variables is linear; (3) for each value of the independent variable, there is a normal
distribution of values for the dependent variable; and (4) the distributions have the same variance. See
MARIJA J. NORUSIS, SPSS I I.O GUIDE TO DATA ANALYSIS 517-68 (2002).
65. Social scientists classifiy data according to levels of measurement into one of three categories:
nominal, ordinal, and interval. See HERBERT M. POLATAK. JR., SOCIAL STATISTICS 15-20 (1979). Nominal
data, such as gender or race, is binary (yes/no) and the appropriate measure of association is the
lambda test, which varies from o to I. Id. Ordinal variables, such as levels of support for political
candidates, have a direction but lack continuous measurement. Id. They are examined by the gamma
statistic, which varies from -I to i. Id. Interval variables, such as income, have an absolute zero and are
measured by Pearson's Product Moment Coefficient (Pearson's R), a regression technique. Id.
66. These methods include logical regression. a multiple regression test designed for situations in
which an outcome variable is dichotomous and predictor variables are either continuous or
categorical. See ANDY FIELD, DISCOVERING STATISTICS USING SPSS 208, 218 (2d ed. 2005).
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more independent variables. When this occurs, introducing the second
variable into the regression equation does not add much new information
beyond what is already supplied by the first variable. Normally, the
remedy for this situation involves the removal of one or more such
variables from the regression model. Yet in the case of voting litigation,
often either one of the parties or the court itself will inquire about or
even stress one of the variables that has been identified as being co-
linear. For example, in the case of race and support for two candidates,
other independent variables of interest, such as income, education, or
partisan affiliation, may share much in common with race. This raises the
issue of whether the shared variance should be assigned to race,
education, income, or political party. Stepwise regression, 67 which some
jurists advocate as a means of solving this problem,68 proceeds by
allocating the shared variance to the variable that is a little stronger, an
approach that is, or at least can be, arbitrary.
But perhaps the most serious problem concerns the misuse of the
output of multiple regression analysis itself. In voting rights cases, as
elsewhere, this normally takes two forms. First, jurists are tempted to use
the magnitude of partial correlation coefficients to draw conclusions
about their relative importance. If some variables have undergone log
transformation or are reported in percentages, while others appear as
proportions, this can yield invalid conclusions. Standardizing the
regression coefficients by means of z-scores (which has the effect of
forcing the Y-intercept to become zero) provides a better means of
making comparisons, but even then, the value of the coefficients depends
on the other variables that are in the regression equation, and the model
needs to be interpreted as a whole.
Another problem involves the use of multiple regression to make
causal inferences. Making valid judgments about causation requires an
experimental research design, consisting of random assignment of
research subjects to treatment and control groups, ideally by means of a
double-blind process. Since voting research almost always is conducted
67. Stepwise regression refers to a technique of regression model building in which the researcher
enters a variable into the model and removes any variables that are no longer significant. For further
discussion of this approach, see NORUSIS, supra note 64, at 533.
68. See League of Latin Am. Citizens v. Clement, 999 F.2d 831, 859 (5th Cir. 1993). In discussing
this issue, Judge Higginbotham stated:
A rule conditioning relief under section 2 upon proof of the existence of racial animus in the
electorate would require plaintiffs to establish the absence of not only partisan voting, but
also all other potentially innocent explanations for white voters' rejection of minority-
preferred candidates. Factors that might legitimately lead white voters to withhold support
from particular minority candidates include, for example, limited campaign funds,
inexperience, or a reputation besmirched by scandal. Because these additional factors map
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after the fact of an election, by definition it cannot be done by means of
experiment. Thus, to claim a cause and effect relationship from mere
correlation is to engage in flawed research. The mere correlation of two
variables does not allow us to conclude anything about their temporal
order, the underlying logic of their relationship, or whether another
variable not included in the research model affects them both.
The foregoing discussion indicates that a basic understanding of
statistics and social science methods is indispensable for legal
professionals who become involved in voting technology cases or other
types of litigation under section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. Before we
address the issue of what happens when the trier of fact has not achieved
this level of understanding in a major voting rights case, we first turn to a
related question: How does the corpus of American voting rights law
apply to the problem of the racial gap in residual votes?
II. THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT AND RACIAL
DISPARITIES IN THE USE OF ELECTION TECHNOLOGY
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act prohibits states and localities
from adopting voting qualifications or practices that result in the denial
or abridgement of the right to vote on account of race or color.69 The
Supreme Court has interpreted the Voting Rights Act expansively to
provide a broad array of measures with which to combat racial
discrimination.7" The Act itself defines the right to vote as including "all
action necessary to make a vote effective," including "casting a ballot
and having such ballot counted properly."7' The broad reach of section 2
extends not only to formal barriers that deny access to the ballot
outright, such as literacy tests or residency requirements, but also to vote
dilution, informal practices such as absentee voter policies, and purges of
inactive voters that may operate in a racially discriminatory manner.
Voting rights scholars refer to the first of these types of voting
discrimination as vote denial or "first generation" strains, in that they
69. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (2000).
No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or procedure shall be
imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision in a manner which results in a
denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of
race or color....
Id.
70. See, e.g., Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 403-04 (199) (holding that vote dilution claims
involving judicial elections are properly within the scope of the protections of section 2); Allen v. State
Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 565-66 (1969).
The Voting Rights Act was aimed at the subtle, as well as the obvious, state regulations
which have the effect of denying citizens their right to vote because of their race. Moreover,
compatible with the decisions of this Court, the Act gives a broad interpretation to the right
to vote, recognizing that voting includes "all action necessary to make a vote effective."
Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 19731(c)(i) (Supp. 1 1964)).
71. 42 U.S.C. § I9731(c)(1).
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arise from outright denial of the franchise.72 The second type, known as
vote dilution or "second generation" strains, consists of challenges
against at-large voting structures or redistricting decisions that adversely
affect the aggregate weight of a minority group's votes.73
In order to determine how section 2 applies to the problem of the
disproportionate denial of black votes by voting equipment, we first
examine the express provisions and relevant legislative history of the
Act. We then consider how courts interpreted section 2 in "first
generation" vote denial cases in the period before 199o. In this period,
the cases either predated the 1982 amendments to the Act or, if they
arose afterwards, the defendants did not pursue defenses that the 1982
amendments indirectly made available. These cases provide insights into
how courts resolved vote denial cases that were based on overt forms of
discrimination where the plaintiffs had no need to rely on circumstantial
or statistical evidence of discrimination. We then take up the related
question of how the Court's literacy test jurisprudence applies to the
problem of racial disparities and voting technology.
Following this review, we consider several "second generation" vote
dilution decisions that illuminate special problems that are germane to
voting technology cases. Although vote dilution cases may appear to be
far removed from the current inquiry, there are two reasons why they
may be relevant. First, given the relative paucity of vote denial litigation
since the early 197Os, especially at the Supreme Court level, the vote
dilution case law provides insight into the Court's requirements
regarding how expert witnesses must prove that a relationship exists
between voting behavior and race. In vote dilution cases, this takes the
form of evidence of racial bloc voting, whereas in voting technology
72. For a discussion of the first generation of voting rights challenges. see Samuel Issacharoff,
Supreme Court Destabilization of Single-Member Districts, 1995 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 205, 210 (1995);
Samuel Issacharoff, Polarized Voting and the Politcal Process: The Transformation of Voting Rights
Jurisprudence, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1833, 1838-39 n.9 (1992) [hereinafter Issacharoff, Polarized Voting];
Pamela S. Karlan, The Right to Vote: Some Pessimism About Formalism, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1705, 1709-
200993).
73. The "second generation" of voting rights challenges is discussed in Lani Guinier, The
Triumph of Tokenism: The Voting Rights Act and the Theory of Black Electoral Success, 89 MICH. L.
REV. 1077, 1093 (1991).
A newer set of "third generation" challenges stresses legislative responsiveness to a minority
group's interests, an aspect of voting rights law that is not relevant here. For discussion of this aspect
of voting rights law, see Lani Guinier, No Two Seats: The Elusive Quest for Political Equality, 77 VA.
L. REV. 1413, 1481-82,1494-95 (1991).
Additionally, it is noteworthy that some scholars do not hold that the line between vote denial
and vote dilution is hard and fast. For example, historian J. Morgan Kousser cites the poll tax as an
example of a voting practice that had a dual effect: those African-Americans who were unable to pay
the tax were denied the franchise outright, whereas those who were able to pay suffered a diminution
in the voting power of African-Americans as a whole. See J. Morgan Kousser, The Voting Rights Act
and the Two Reconstructions, in CONTROVERSIES IN MINORITY VOTING: THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT IN
PERSPECTIVE 174 (Bernard Grofman & Chandler Davidson eds.. 1992).
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cases, it concerns the analogous question of how to prove that a racial
disparity exists in the incidence of residual votes. Second, in the period
following the 1982 amendments, some defendants in vote dilution cases
have successfully used a causation defense under the totality of the
circumstances inquiry. As several recent challenges to voter purge and
felon disenfranchisement laws demonstrate, this defense also may apply
to vote denial cases, including those challenging voting technology.
In examining this issue, we begin with Thornburg v. Gingles74 and
the unresolved question of whether plaintiffs may prove racial bloc
voting merely by presenting evidence of simple correlations between
race and voting behavior or whether they also must use multiple
regression or other evidence to refute the counter-argument that other
variables, such as partisanship or candidate reputation, may have led to
racially disparate voting outcomes. We then analyze several appellate
court decisions that adopt inconsistent and conflicting approaches to the
problem of causation under section 2 and conclude that the approach
adopted by the Ninth Circuit in Farrakhan v. Washington75 is most
faithful to the intent of Congress in passing the 1982 amendments to the
Voting Rights Act.
A. THE PURPOSES AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE ACT
In its original form, the Voting Rights Act of 1965 prohibited states
or other political subdivisions from adopting qualifications or practices
that denied the right to vote on the basis of race. 6 Initially, the focus of
the Act was on the elimination of barriers to voter registration. Congress
sanctioned a broad array of administrative initiatives to accomplish this
task, including the authorization of federal marshals for voter
registration and a set of pre-clearance requirements for jurisdictions that
had a legacy of low levels of voter registration among racial minorities.77
When it was first asked to review the constitutionality of the Act, the
Supreme Court described the overriding purpose of the legislation by
noting simply that Congress enacted the Voting Rights Act for the broad
remedial purpose of ridding the country of racial discrimination in
voting.7
In this sense, the Voting Rights Act represents the major statutory
prohibition of all voting rights discrimination,79 and it necessarily sweeps
74. 478 U.S. 30 (t986).
75. 338 F.3d ioo9, 1017-19 (9th Cir. 2003).
76. As originally enacted in 1965, section 2 of the Act provided: "No voting qualification or
prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or
political subdivision to deny or abridge the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account
of race or color." 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1965).
77. See id.
78. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 3 83 U.S. 301, 315 (1966).
79. See S. REP. No. 97-417, at 30 (1982), as reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 207 [hereinafter S.
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broadly. In his testimony during the hearings on the Voting Rights Act in
1965, Attorney General Katzenbach noted that section 2 would ban "any
kind ofpractice.., if its purpose or effect was to deny or abridge the right
to vote on account of race or color."" Yet because the Act utilized an
administrative framework to assure the rapid registration of
disenfranchised minority citizens, from the outset most of the reported
case law focused on the problem of vote dilution rather than vote
denial." For this reason, nearly all of the subsequent legislative debate,
and the eventual construction of the 1982 amendments to the Act, arose
more from a concern over vote dilution than vote denial.
In 1982, legislative majorities in both the House of Representatives
and the Senate expressed disapproval of the interpretation that the
Supreme Court gave the Voting Rights Act in Mobile v. Bolden s2 a vote
dilution challenge against an at-large election system for county
supervisors in Mobile, Alabama. 3 In Bolden, a plurality of the Court
changed the burden on plaintiffs in voting discrimination cases by
requiring proof of discriminatory purpose." Congress concluded that this
requirement "divert[ed] the judicial inquiry from the crucial question of
whether minorities have equal access to the electoral process to a
historical question of individual motives. ' ' 8, Congress amended section 2
by clarifying that electoral practices that result in the denial or
abridgement of the right to vote on the basis of race also violate the Act,
if, under the totality of the circumstances, protected classes under the
Act have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to
participate in the political process and elect representatives of their
REP.]. According to its preamble, the purpose of the Voting Rights Act was to enforce the Fifteenth
Amendment. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1965). As the Supreme Court has said, "The Act was drafted to
make the guarantees of the Fifteenth Amendment finally a reality for all citizens." Katzenbach, 383
U.S. at 308.
8o. S. REP., supra note 79, at 17 (first emphasis added). The Committee on the Judiciary noted
that "[wihile no single statement can be conclusive of what Congress's purpose was in adopting the
Voting Rights Act in 1965, the Supreme Court has pointed out that the Attorney General played an
'extensive role' in drafting the Act and explaining its operation to Congress." Id. at 17; accord United
States v. Bd. of Comm'rs, 435 U.S. IO, 131 (1978) (describing Katzenbach's contemporaneous
interpretation of the Act as "persuasive" and stating that his remarks should be accorded "great
deference").
8r. While it is certainly true that there are numerous reported decisions under the Voting Rights
Act that do involve vote denial, our impression, drawn on our general view of the case law, is that
since 1965 the vast majority of litigation under the Act has occurred under the rubric of vote dilution,
not vote denial. See, e.g., Johnson v. DeGrandy, 512 U.S. 997 (I994); Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S.
30 (1986); Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613 (1982); Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (I98O). For a general
discussion suggesting the pervasiveness of vote dilution cases, see SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF ET AL., WHEN
ELECTIONS Go BAD: THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY AND THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION OF 2000 762-866 (2d ed.
2002).
82. 446 U.S. at 58.
83. E.g., S. REP., supra note 79.
84. 446 U.S. at 58.
85. S. REP., supra note 79, at 16.
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The Senate Judiciary Committee Majority Report provided a list of
"broad, non-exclusive" factors that are relevant to the consideration of
whether the political processes are open to all on a non-discriminatory
basis. Generally, these factors include a history of official discrimination,
racially polarized voting, suspect electoral practices, racial appeals in
campaigns, lack of electoral success among minority candidates, and non-
responsiveness by elected officials to minority community concerns."7 As
both the Senate Majority Report and the express provisions of section
2(b) state:
The courts are to look at the totality of the circumstances in order to
determine whether the result of the challenged practice is that the
political processes are equally open . . . The courts are to conduct this
analysis on the basis of a variety of objective factors concerning the
impact of the challenged practice and the social and political context in
which it occurs.""
In drafting the 1982 amendments, Congress's overriding goal was to
clarify the appropriate legal standards for vote dilution cases.89 For the
most part, its consideration of vote denial cases and the underlying
question of how the new statutory requirements would apply to such
cases was overshadowed by the debate over vote dilution requirements.
86. See 42 U.S.C. § 8973 (2000). As amended, section 2 now provides:
(a) No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or procedure shall
be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision in a manner which results in a
denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of
race or color, or in contravention of the guarantees set forth in section 4(f)(2), as provided
in subsection (b).
(b) A violation of subsection (a) is established if, based on the totality of the circumstances,
it is shown that the political processes leading to nomination or election in the State or
political subdivision are not equally open to participation by members of a class of citizens
protected by subsection (a) in that its members have less opportunity than other members
of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their
choice. The extent to which members of a protected class have been elected to office in the
State or political subdivision is one circumstance which may be considered: Provided, That
nothing in this section establishes a right to have members of a protected class elected in
numbers equal to their proportion in the population.
Id.
87. See id. The Senate factors include: a history of official voting-relating discrimination in the
state or political subdivision; the extent to which voting in the elections of the state or political
subdivision is racially polarized; the extent to which the state or political subdivision has used electoral
practices that tend to enhance the opportunity for discrimination; whether minorities have been
excluded from any candidate slating process; the extent to which minority groups bear the effects of
discrimination in such areas as education, employment and health, which hinder their ability to
participate effectively in the political process; the extent to which political campaigns have been
characterized by overt or subtle racial appeals; the extent to which minority members have been
elected to public office; whether there is a significant lack of responsiveness on the part of elected
officials to the particularized needs of minority groups; and whether the policy underlying the use of
such voting qualification, prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice or procedure is tenuous. See id.
88. Id. at 68; 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b).
89. See S. REP., supra note 79, at 2.
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Three aspects of the amendments indicate why this is the case.9" First,
instead of phrasing the substantive right to be free from voting
discrimination in terms of an individual's entitlement to register and
vote, Congress chose language that couched the right in terms of a
protected class's ability to participate in the political process on an equal
basis with others.9" Arguably, this represents a fundamental shift in focus
from enfranchisement to the impact of a group's collective votes, a point
not lost on Republican critics of the 1982 amendments.92
Second, in the section 2(b) amendments, Congress inserted a
"totality of the circumstances" provision93 that now undergirds much of
voting rights litigation. On its face, this provision appears much more
relevant to vote dilution cases than instances of overt vote denial. The
express wording of section 2(b) states that proof of voting discrimination
"is established" where the totality of the circumstances indicates that
minority voters do not participate on an equal basis with non-minority
voters and are unable to elect candidates of their choice. This choice of
language implies that voting discrimination need not be overt, as would
be the case, for example, if a registrar deliberately refused to register an
individual because of his or her race. It further implies that "results" or
"impact" discrimination always is subtle, as it would be in the vote
dilution context, where discrimination must be proved by circumstantial
statistical evidence. Arguably, the fact that Congress did not utilize more
restrictive wording, such as "voting discrimination must be shown under
the totality of the circumstances," leaves open the possibility that the
totality of the circumstances test is only one of several alternative means
of proving voting discrimination. But many courts construe the "totality
of the circumstances" language as an overarching requirement, even
though it may be superfluous in instances of intentional vote denial or
neutral voting practices that result in overt vote denial. Not only did
Congress fail to address this problem directly, but it also compounded
the confusion by requiring "objective" proof of unequal political
participation' and linkage to social and historical discrimination.95 By
90. See id.
9I. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b).
92. S. REP., supra note 79, at 128-29. According to Senator Orin Hatch (R-Utah), these changes
amounted to "a substantial transformation of the Voting Rights Act." Id. at 120.
93. Id.
94. S. REP., supra note 79, at 68. As the Majority Report phrased it:
By codifying the "results" standard articulated in White, and its progeny, the amendment
retains the repeated emphasis in those cases that there is nothing, per se, unlawful about at
large elections systems. Only when such systems operate, in the context of other objective
factors and the totality of circumstances, to effectively deny members of a minority group
the opportunity to participate equally in the process, is a violation established.
Id.
95. See id. at 28-29. As noted, the Senate Report discussed several factors that had been
identified in several voting rights cases that established a violation of section 2, including "the extent
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stressing the search for social and historical discrimination, the totality of
the circumstances test implicitly assumes that overt discrimination has
not occurred.
Finally, the Senate factors themselves-which form the basis for
much, if not all, of the totality of the circumstances inquiry-focus
primarily on issues that apply exclusively to vote dilution challenges.9 Of
the nine enumerated factors, five address either redistricting, racial bloc
voting, the lack of responsiveness of elected officials, or the extent to
which members of minority groups have been elected to public office.97
Arguably, the totality of the circumstances test and the Senate factors
added requirements that were not germane to many vote denial
challenges, especially those presenting overt evidence that minority
voters were excluded from the franchise.
This is not to suggest that Congress did not have good reasons to
focus on the evils of vote dilution as it debated the 1982 amendments.
Rather, the point is that as a matter of draftsmanship, the test for vote
denial set forth in the original Act became more cumbersome and diffuse
as a result of the 1982 amendments. Yet, a careful review of the
legislative history indicates that Congress did not intend for the 1982
amendments to extinguish vote denial challenges under the Act. Nor did
Congress intend that the framework for vote dilution challenges apply
wholesale to vote denial cases. Because this point is often lost, it may be
helpful to examine the evidence in support of these propositions in
greater depth.
In several places, the Senate Report indicates that section 2 is broad
enough to cover both "episodic" voting-related discriminatory practices,
such as vote denial problems, as well as permanent structural barriers,
such as problems with redistricting or at-large elections.9 Indeed, the
Committee Report expressly states that "if the challenged practice
relates to... a series of events or episodes, the proof sufficient to
establish a violation would not necessarily involve the same factors as the
of any history of official discrimination in the state or political subdivision that touched the right of the
members of the minority group to register, to vote or otherwise to participate in the democratic
process." Id.
96. See supra note 87.
97. Id.
98. See, e.g., S. REP., supra note 79, at 30. In one recent case, Judge Buckwalter of the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania had this to say about the continuing
viability of vote dilution challenges under section 2, notwithstanding the primary focus on vote denial
cases that has occurred over the past forty years:
Although there have been relatively few cases challenging episodic practices such as voter
purge laws pursuant to section 2, the legislative history accompanying the 1982 amendment
of the Voting Rights Act clearly illustrates that Congress intended section 2 to be the major
statutory prohibition against all types of voting related discrimination.
Ortiz v. Philadelphia, 824 F. Supp. 514, 521-22 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
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courts have utilized when dealing with permanent structural barriers. '
In both cases, however, the "ultimate test" is whether, in the context of
the facts presented, the practice denies the plaintiffs an equal
opportunity to participate and to elect candidates of their choice.
Thus, the Senate factors should be interpreted as "neither
comprehensive nor exclusive."'" Instead, they are relevant only to the
extent that they apply to the fact pattern presented and the nature of the
election procedure that is under challenge. The legislative history
endorses a flexible approach when evaluating section 2 challenges, rather
than a "mechanical" point counting analysis."' Moreover, "there is no
requirement that any particular number of factors be proved, or that a
majority of them point one way or the other .... .
While these remarks clearly indicate that Congress did not intend
the Senate factors to represent the sine qua non of voting rights cases,
the Committee Report yields considerably less clarity concerning the
relationship between the new results test and the need to establish, under
the totality of the circumstances, evidence of broader social and political
discrimination. In this respect, the primary problem is that nearly every
time the results test is discussed, it appears in the context of vote dilution
and the totality of the circumstances test. Consider, for example, the
following two quotations from the Senate Report:
The courts are to look at the totality of the circumstances in order to
determine whether the result of the challenged practice is that the
political processes are equally open .... The courts are to conduct this
analysis on the basis of a variety of objective factors concerning the
impact of the challenged practice and the social and political context in
which it occurs.
0 3
By codifying the "results" standard articulated in White [v.
Regester 4] and its progeny, the amendment retains the repeated
emphasis in those cases that there is nothing, per se, unlawful about at
large elections systems. Only when such systems operate, in the context
of other objective factors and the totality of circumstances, to
99. S. REP., supra note 79, at 30.
ioo. As the Supreme Court has stated:
The [Senate] Report stresses.., that this list of typical factors is neither comprehensive nor
exclusive. While the enumerated factors will often be pertinent to certain types of section 2
violations, particularly to vote dilution claims, other factors may also be relevant and may
be considered. Furthermore, the Senate Committee observed that "there is no requirement
that any particular number of factors be proved, or that a majority of them point one way or
the other". Rather, the Committee determined that "the question whether the political
processes are 'equally open' depends upon a searching practical evaluation of the 'past and
present reality,"' and on a "functional" view of the political process.
Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 45 (1986) (internal footnotes and citations omitted) (citing S. REP.,
supra note 79, at 29-30 & 30 n.120).
sot. S. REP., supra note 79, at 29.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 68.
104. 412 U.S. 755 (1973).
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effectively deny members of a minority group the opportunity to
participate equally in the process, is a violation established. 5
The question that emerges from remarks such as these is whether
the totality of the circumstances test and the need to establish evidence
of social and historical discrimination necessarily must apply to vote
denial cases that allege voting discrimination on the basis of results,
rather than intent. Although several circuit courts have held that the
totality of the circumstances test applies to both vote denial and vote
dilution cases,' 6 the Supreme Court has not specifically addressed this
issue. It would seem clear that where plaintiffs present evidence of overt
vote denial, in a context that does not concern the dilution of minority
votes through a permanent structural barrier like an at-large voting
system or a redistricting scheme, the Senate factors themselves, and even
the totality of the circumstances test, would not apply. Prior to the 1982
amendments this was the case, I"7 and nothing in the legislative history of
the 1982 amendments suggests any intent to change these precedents.
Yet as a practical matter, the addition of the section 2(b) language has
made this situation much less clear. As a matter of logic and common
sense, these requirements would not seem to be germane to instances of
overt vote denial. However, we have found no reported decision holding
that the totality of the circumstances test does not apply to vote denial
cases. Instead, several federal courts have simply recited the Senate
factors, including the totality of the circumstances test and the three
required Gingles factors of compactness, cohesiveness, and minority bloc
voting,' ° and then ruled that all of these factors were inapplicable to the
facts presented."°
Arguably, the applicability of the totality of circumstances test may
turn on the precise nature of the vote denial scheme. If election officials
blatantly deny voters access to the ballot on the basis of race, the totality
105. S. REP., supra note 79, at 68.
io6. See, e.g., Smith v. Salt River Project Agric. Improvement & Power Dist., IO9 F.3d 586, 596 n.8
(9th Cir. 1997).
io7. For a review of early vote denial cases that do not use the totality of the circumstances
framework, see infra, Part II.C.I.
io8. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 49 (1986). Elsewhere in Gingles, the Court noted,
"some Senate Report factors are more important to multi-member district vote dilution claims than
others." Id.
io9. See, e.g., Farrakhan v. Washington, 338 F.3d 1009, 1015-16 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding that Senate
factors are neither comprehensive nor exclusive, and that courts must determine "how the challenged
practice 'interacts with social and historical conditions to cause an inequality in the opportunities
enjoyed by black and white voters to elect their preferred representatives"') (quoting Gingles, 478
U.S. at 47); Ortiz v. City of Philadelphia, 28 F.3d 306,309-10 (3d Cir. 1994) (noting Senate factors and
Gingles three-part test but not applying them in challenge to Pennsylvania vote purge statute); Miss.
State Chapter, Operation PUSH v. Allain, 674 F. Supp. 1245, 1264-65 (N.D. Miss. 1987) (holding that
racially polarized voting, racial appeals in campaigns, candidate slating process, voting requirements
such as large election districts, and majority vote requirements were irrelevant to the claim involving
the challenged registration procedures).
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of the circumstances are immaterial. But if all voters are granted access
to the ballot, yet voting equipment interacts with racial disparities in
background social conditions to cause greater levels of residual votes
among African-American than non-African-American voters, the
totality of the circumstances may be highly relevant. There is nothing
intrinsic to race or ethnicity that leads to lost votes; instead, it is the
interaction between racial disparities in economics, employment, and
education and the voting equipment that yields an inability to participate
in the franchise and elect candidates of one's choice. Under the Senate
factors, this evidence would thus be an appropriate part of a successful
section 2 claim.
Apart from this problem, the legislative history of the 1982
amendments also includes a set of concerns brought forward by the
Republican minority. The Subcommittee Report and the individual
remarks of Republican members of the Senate Judiciary Committee
reflect a level of criticism against the 1982 amendments that in many
respects was prescient. The criticism emphasized three themes: (i) the
need to retain a focus on registration of blacks and enfranchisement from
the original Act, rather than the new themes of "electoral outcomes,"
"group rights," and "equal political participation" of the proposed
amendment; (2) the desirability of following the contours of the
Fifteenth Amendment concerning the retention of the requirement of
intentional discrimination in voting rights litigation; and (3) the
importance of maintaining strict standards for the causation, or "on
account of race" element, under section 2.
Although these three Republican positions did not receive majority
support in either the House of Representatives or the Senate in 1982,
they did serve as the basis for the insertion of compromise language in
the amended section 2(b) that disavowed any requirement of
proportional representation under the Act."' In addition, these positions
provided a blueprint for defendants and conservative jurists to use in
subsequent voting rights cases, and at least some of these themes have
been incorporated into voting rights jurisprudence over the past twenty
years.
To appreciate this point, consider the third objection-the "on
account of race" requirement. This objection closely resembles the
approach that Chief Justice Waite used to emaciate the 187o and 1872
Enforcement Acts in United States v. Reese"' and United States v.
Cruikshank,"3 in which the Court abandoned the federal effort to
Io. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (2000).
iii. For further analysis of this point, see infra Part IlI.C.4 .
112. 92 U.S. 214, 218 (1876).
113. 92 U.S. 542, 556 (1876). The two federal statutes at issue in Reese and Cruikshank represented
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guarantee voting rights for the freedmen following the first
Reconstruction. Waite's insistence that congressional regulation of the
state electoral process be limited to denials of the right to vote because of
race meant that denials for other reasons, such as failure to comply with
literacy test or good citizenship requirements, would not violate federal
law. This interpretation restricted the reach of federal voting rights law
to fact patterns involving intentional acts of discrimination that
represented the cause or motivational force that led directly to the denial
or abridgement of the right to vote. The 1982 amendments altered this
situation by expressly prohibiting voting practices that resulted in
discrimination as well. But a reinvigorated causation requirement that
interprets the phrase "on account of race" to mean that the challenged
voting practice must have a direct and proximate racially discriminatory
effect could place a similar restrictive gloss on the exercise of voting
rights.
As the backbone of the Act, section 2 constitutes "the major
statutory prohibition of all voting rights discrimination,'' I4  and it
prohibits both vote denial and vote dilution on the basis of race.
Although the 1982 amendments grafted language onto the original Act
that in many respects is better suited to vote dilution actions, vote denial
claims continue to be at least a part of current voting rights
jurisprudence. In order to further explicate the legal framework for
analysis of voting denial claims, we turn now to an examination of the
case law, both before the causation defense made its initial appearance in
the late I98OS, and afterwards.
B. THE VOTE DENIAL CASE LAW: A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
i. "Early" Vote Denial Cases
In the period before the 1982 amendments, and for a short time
thereafter, vote denial challenges under section 2 utilized a two-pronged
legal framework that differed significantly from the framework used in
the Reconstruction Congress's primary effort at defending the right of freedmen to participate in the
franchise. The first act provided for federal supervision of congressional elections, including oversight
of registration and ballot counting activities. An Act to Enforce the Rights of Citizens of the United
States to Vote, 16 Stat. 140 (1870). The amendment to the second statute authorized the executive
branch to curtail the activities of conspiratorial organizations that sought to prevent blacks from
voting. 16 Stat. 433 (187j), amended by 17 Stat. 13. However, in both cases, Chief Justice Waite ruled
that the scope of Congress's power with respect to the regulation of state elections was limited to
situations involving intentional racial discrimination. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 556; Reese, 92 U.S. at 218.
Therefore, any indictment under the 187o and 1872 Enforcement Acts had to be based on the
contention that African-Americans were harmed or denied their right to vote because of their race,
and Congress lacked the constitutional power to proscribe unintentional acts of voting discrimination.
This opened the way for states to adopt electoral practices that ostensibly discriminated not on the
grounds of race but on other grounds, such as literacy, with the aim of accomplishing the same result,
the disenfranchisement of African-Americans.
114. S. REP., supra note 79, at 30.
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vote dilution cases or in vote denial cases today. The threshold question
was whether the plaintiff's complaint alleged that a voting practice
represented an act of intentional discrimination on the grounds of race,
or, alternatively, whether the complaint alleged that a facially neutral
voting policy had an adverse, discriminatory effect on minority voters. In
vote denial cases, the two-pronged framework focused first on whether
the "events" or "episodes" in question were significant enough to rise to
the level of "voting practices or procedures" for purposes of section 2."'
If they did, then the second question was whether the voting practices
operated to deny African-Americans an equal opportunity to participate
and elect candidates of their choice.
6
The first prong of this framework is illustrated in cases that address
what purportedly may appear to be discretionary behavior on the part of
voting officials. For example, in Brown v. Post, elections officials made
absentee ballots available to white voters at a nursing home but not to
residents of an African-American nursing home."7 The trial court held
that this rose to the level of an intentional "practice" for purposes of
section 2, and it went on to hold that this voting practice denied African-
American voters an equal opportunity to participate in the electoral
process in violation of section 2."'
A second example of the two-pronged framework arose in Harris v.
Siegelman."9 There, black voters in Alabama challenged the Sayre law, a
statute dating back to 1893 that required voters to affirm their illiteracy
before they could obtain the assistance of a poll worker. 2' Through
historical evidence, the plaintiffs established that the legislature's intent
was to disenfranchise African-American voters by forcing illiterate
persons to declare this fact before the poll worker, who, in effect, would
provide "assistance" that yielded votes for white supremacist
candidates.'"' Addressing the first prong, the trial court held that this
constituted a voting practice for purposes of the Voting Rights Act.'22
The court also concluded that all of the poll workers who assisted the
illiterate voters were white, a policy that was facially neutral but arguably
had a discriminatory effect.'23 On these facts, the trial court held that
both the underlying intent of the Alabama legislature in adopting this
statute and the effects of this policy on illiterate black voters were




ii9. 695 F. Supp. 517 (M.D. Ala. 1988).
12o. Id. at 522.
121. Id. at 524-25.
122. Id. at 526.
123. Id. at 525.
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discriminatory.'24
A final illustration from the early case law is Toney v. White.'25
There, a local board of election rejected 250 absentee ballots notarized
by an authorized official upon proof that four of these ballots were not
notarized in her presence."' African-Americans cast all of the rejected
ballots, and the election was close enough that the rejection of the ballots
enabled two white candidates to be elected.'27 The trial court held that
policies concerning authorization of absentee ballots were voting
practices for purposes of section 2 and that the purge of all 250 ballots
cast by the African-American absentee voters had a discriminatory effect
in violation of the Voting Rights Act.
The relative simplicity of the legal framework used in these "early"
vote denial cases reflects both the seriousness with which Congress and
the federal courts sought to eradicate the vestiges of voting
discrimination as well as the unwillingness of state defendants, as a
matter of public relations and political profile, to mount a rigorous
defense of allegedly discriminatory local voting policies.
2. Literacy Test Cases
The origins of the literacy test date back to the period of
Reconstruction and its aftermath, when Congress adopted laws to
guarantee freedmen equal rights, and pre-Reconstruction southerners
used a variety of initiatives to maintain white supremacy.'29 Early drafts
of the Fifteenth Amendment included bans on both literacy and property
tests as prerequisites for the franchise, but these provisions were deleted
by roll call vote prior to final congressional approval of the present
amendment. By the end of Reconstruction in 1876, white supremacists
launched a counterrevolution, using violence, fraud, and ultimately, legal
change to disenfranchise African-Americans. 3 ° These reforms, which
were enacted in seven southern states between 1895 and 19o8, included
amendments to state constitutions that required poll taxes, literacy tests,
124. Id. at 522, 526.
125. 348 F. Supp. 188 (W.D. La. 1972).
126. Id. at 190-94.
127. Id. at 194.
128. Id. at 196.
129. For a discussion of the legislative history that led to adoption of the Fifteenth Amendment,
see EDWARD MACPHERSON, THE POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA DURING THE
PERIOD OF RECONSTRUCTION 399-406 (2nd ed. 1969) (detailing the final Congressional votes and votes
of state legislatures regarding the adoption of the Fifteenth Amendment); Kousser, supra note 73, at
135-40 (detailing the historical and political circumstances surrounding ratification and
implementation of the Fifteenth Amendment).
130. For a historical analysis of these events, see generally ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION:
AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863-1877 (Henry Steele Commager & Richard B. Morris eds.,
1988) (discussing the resurgence of racism near the end of Reconstruction and detailing the Supreme
Court's limitation on federal power); Kousser, supra note 73.
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and property restrictions on the franchise.'3 '
The Court's earliest literacy test decisions arose well before the
adoption of the Voting Rights Act, in the context of challenges brought
under the Fifteenth Amendment.'32 In these decisions, the Court declined
to rule that literacy tests were per se unconstitutional.'33 Instead, it held
that where literacy tests are coupled with great local discretion and are
little more than a device to facilitate racial discrimination, they were
unlawful under the Fifteenth Amendment.'34 Following the adoption of
the Voting Rights Act, the Court reviewed literacy requirements on
several occasions, and each time it sustained Congress's power to
prohibit the tests. In South Carolina v. Katzenbach, it upheld Congress's
power to ban the literacy test for five years in specific states with a
history of racial discrimination.'33 In Katzenbach v. Morgan, it upheld
section 4(e) of the Act from a challenge against the prohibition on
English literacy tests in circumstances where citizens were educated in
non-English language, "American-flag" schools. 36 And in Gaston County
v. United States, the Court rejected North Carolina's bid to reintroduce
literacy tests, citing evidence of unequal educational opportunities. '
Finally, in Oregon v. Mitchell, the Court sustained Congress's power to
suspend literacy tests nationwide.'
This brief review of early vote denial decisions shows that Bush v.
131. H.R. REP. No. 89-439, at 2443 (1965). According to the Committee on the Judiciary's Report
Accompanying the Voting Rights Act of 1965, Mississippi, South Carolina, Virginia, Georgia,
Alabama, and Louisiana required reading or writing tests. Id. Louisiana, Virginia, and Mississippi
required voter registration forms to be perfectly completed. Mississippi, South Carolina, Louisiana,
and Virginia instituted oral tests of constitutional understanding and interpretation, while Alabama,
Georgia, Louisiana, and Mississippi adopted "obligation of citizenship" tests. Id. Alabama, Mississippi,
and Louisiana also adopted good moral character requirements. Id. For further discussion of the early
history of literacy tests, see generally FONER, supra note 130; J. MORGAN KoUSSER, THE SHAPING OF
SOUTHERN POLITICS: SUFFRAGE RESTRICTION AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ONE-PARTY SOUTH, 1880-
1910 (1974) (discussing the literacy qualifications adopted by states from 189o to 19o8 and the escape
clauses which accompanied them). The Supreme Court struck down the poll tax as a violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause in Harper v. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666-67
(1966).
132. Butler v. Thompson, 341 U.S. 937, 937 (1951) (upholding Virginia poll tax law); Breedlove v.
Suttles, 302 U.S. 277, 283 (1937) (upholding Georgia poll tax law).
133. See, e.g., Lassiter v. Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 53-54 (1959), superseded by statute, Voting
Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973, as recognized in Morse v. Republican Party, 517 U.S. 186 (1996).
Although the Court refused to find literacy tests unconstitutional per se, Chief Justice Warren, after
examining the evidence before Congress, did say that. "'Under these circumstances, the Fifteenth
Amendment has clearly been violated." South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 385 U.S. 301, 334 (1956).
134. Lassiter, 36o U.S. at 53; accord Davis v. Schnell, 81 F. Supp. 872, 88o-8i (S.D. Ala. 1949),
affd, 336 U.S. 933 (949).
135. 383 U.S. at 330.
136. 384 U.S. 641.652-53 (1966).
137. 395 U.S. 285, 296-97 (1969).
138. 400 U.S. 112, 131-34 (1970).
[Vol. 58:1
THE RACIAL GAP IN LOST VOTES
GoreI' was not the first time that federal courts addressed legal problems
with the "nuts and bolts" of the electoral process.'40 Routine activities
such as voter registration drives at nursing homes or the notarization of
absentee ballots have been challenged successfully under the Voting
Rights Act when they are performed in a racially discriminatory manner.
Similarly, the routine activity of ballot tabulation can be the basis for
legal challenge if it results in the disenfranchisement of disproportionate
numbers of African-American voters. Likewise, the literacy test cases
provide a suitable framework for bringing a successful voting technology
challenge. Collectively, the Court's literacy test jurisprudence stands for
the proposition that the legacy of unequal educational opportunity in the
United States can yield inequalities in political participation on the basis
of race. Of all the forms of voting technology in common use throughout
the United States, punch cards may require the greatest levels of literacy.
Voters must read a set of instructions concerning the proper insertion of
the ballot card, the use of the booklet and stylus, and the process of
checking the ballot for hanging chads. As a result, voters who are
functionally illiterate-are at an increased risk of disenfranchisement.
Although there is no per se constitutional rule against voting
practices that have an adverse effect on uneducated voters, the original
objection to such tests was that they disadvantaged African-Americans,
who were subjected to inferior, segregated educational systems. 4' To the
extent that African-Americans and other racial minorities are
overrepresented in the class of persons with low levels of educational
attainment and high levels of illiteracy, this condition can properly be
associated with a history of intentional discrimination. Particularly in
areas with a history of de jure segregation in public schools, heavily
segregated inner-city communities that have been held to suffer from
unequal school funding that is unlawful under state constitutions, or
school districts that have a history of unsuccessful performance on state
educational proficiency examinations, the totality of the circumstances
could show a racially disparate effect that in turn may violate section 2.
The Republican critique of the Democratic amendments to the
Voting Rights Act in 1982, along with a series of subsequent court
decisions, contributed to the transformation of the legal framework in
these early vote denial cases by reinstating a strict causation defense that
139. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
140. See Richard L. Hasen, Bush v. Gore and the Future of Equal Protection Law in Elections, 29
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 377, 378 (2001).
141. See, e.g., Mitchell, 400 U.S. at 1331. For a more recent example of the relationship between
race and failing schools, see Michael Martinez et al., Race, Poverty Define Failing Schools, CHi. TRIB.,
July 21, 2002, at i. The authors report that as of the conclusion of the 2002 academic year, 178 of 179
Chicago Public Schools on a list of failing schools have predominately black or Hispanic enrollments.
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forced plaintiffs to address with far greater rigor the extent to which
minority plaintiffs were being denied the right to vote "on account of
race." It is to these decisions that we now turn.
C. VOTE DILUTION AND THE RISE OF THE CAUSATION DEFENSE
Although the early vote denial cases under the Voting Rights Act
proved largely non-controversial, the vote dilution cases brought under
section 2 that challenged redistricting plans or at-large voting structures
triggered far more acrimonious debate. One of the major themes of this
debate concerns the requirement that voting discrimination, as a matter
of causation, occur "on account of race."
Initially, during the i96os and 1970s, the Court analyzed vote
dilution cases using two somewhat vague requirements. First, plaintiffs
had to demonstrate that they had "less opportunity [than majoritarian
white voters] ... to participate in the political processes and to elect
legislators of their choice.""'4 Second, the Court required plaintiffs
challenging multi-member districts to make this showing based on the
totality of the circumstances. '43 A subsequent dispute between the Court
and Congress concerning the meaning of these requirements eventually
produced a clearer standard. The source of the dispute was the
controversial Mobile v. Bolden decision, in which the Supreme Court
held that plaintiffs challenging at-large election schemes under the
Fourteenth Amendment, Fifteenth Amendment, and Voting Rights Act
had to prove purposeful discrimination in order to prevail.1" In 1982,
Congress responded by amending the Voting Rights Act to permit
plaintiffs to establish a violation of the Act by proving that an electoral
practice had a discriminatory effect.'45 In so doing, it codified a set of so-
called "Senate factors" that were relevant to the totality of circumstances
inquiry.46
As noted earlier, these factors included a history of official voting
discrimination, special election provisions, slating, social disadvantage,
racial campaigns, and minority campaign success that could be proven
through direct observation.'47 However, another major factor-racially
polarized voting-was to become the sine qua non of voting
142. Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 149 (197I).
143. White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755,769-70 (1973).
144. 446 U.S. 55, 65-66 (I98O).
145. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (20o6).
146. For further discussion of the Senate factors, see generally Issacharoff, Polarized Voting, supra
note 72; Joseph P. Viteritti, Unapportioned Justice: Local Elections, Social Science, and the Evolution
of the Voting Rights Act, 4 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. PoL'Y 199 (1994). In its response to Bolden, Congress
emphasized the standards originally defined in Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297 (5th Cir. 1973),
affdper curiam sub nom. East Carroll Parish Sch. Bd. v. Marshall, 424 U.S. 636 (1976) and White, 412
U.S. 755.
147. See cases cited supra Part II.C.
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discrimination in vote dilution cases. This factor was, or at least could be,
far more subtle than the approach that the Court previously used, and it
soon became the focus of considerable attention.
In Thornburg v. Gingles,'4s the Supreme Court responded to
Congress's 1982 amendments, and in so doing, issued what to date has
been the Court's most comprehensive statement concerning what
constitutes voting discrimination. The Gingles Court sanctioned a set of
social science methods for proving racially polarized voting that are
directly applicable to voting technology cases.'49 While a majority of the
Court in Gingles approved of these methods, there was no opinion for
the Court on the question of whether the legal concept of racially
polarized voting refers only to a correlation between the race of voters
and voter choice or whether causation evidence, which might include the
impact of other socioeconomic or political factors, could be used in
rebuttal. Justice Brennan's plurality opinion stressed that "multivariate"
analysis is inappropriate in racial bloc voting cases because under a
"results test" it is only the extent of difference between the choices made
by blacks and whites and not the reasons for this difference that is the
relevant inquiry.'5 ° Brennan also argued that socioeconomic variables
such as education and income are themselves often correlated with race
and are among the factors that Congress authorized for use in proving
that racial discrimination exists.'5 ' Justice O'Connor, writing for three
other Justices, disagreed.'5 2 She contended that "[t]he overall vote
dilution inquiry neither requires nor permits an arbitrary rule against
consideration of all evidence concerning voting preferences other than
statistical evidence of racial voting patterns."'53 This opened the door for
consideration of nonracial variables that might explain why white voters
did not support the black candidate.
Justice White issued a brief, somewhat enigmatic, concurring
opinion, in which he agreed with all parts of Justice Brennan's opinion
except Part II.C, the portion dealing with the test for polarized voting. '
The sole reason Justice White cited for his disagreement with Justice
Brennan concerned whether one factor in the identification of polarized
voting is the race of the candidate.'55 Justice Brennan answered this
question in the negative,' 56 while Justice White-together with the four
148. 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
149. For a discussion of these methods, see supra Part I and the Methodological Appendix, infra.
150. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 63.
i51. Id. at 62.
152. Id. at iOI (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgement).
153. Id.
154. Id. at 83 (White, J., concurring).
155. Id.
156. Id. at 67-68.
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justices in the O'Connor bloc-answered in the affirmative.'57 At no
point, however, did Justice White weigh in on the crucial question of
whether the concept of racially polarized voting requires voting patterns
to be caused by race or merely correlated with race.
Advocates of Justice Brennan's position argue that because Justice
White did not expressly voice concern over Justice Brennan's choice of a
correlation framework, they were in agreement on this matter.'5 Those
siding with the Justice O'Connor bloc argue that Justice White disagreed
with Part II.C of Justice Brennan's opinion in its entirety, and thus there
were five votes against it. 59 However, the problem with the latter
argument is that at no point did Justice White voice support for the
alternative "causation" approach that Justice O'Connor advocated. Nor
do the Court's later vote dilution cases resolve this issue.
Justice O'Connor's invitation for defendants in voting rights cases to
introduce evidence of nonracial variables as alternative explanations for
voting outcomes has given rise to several reported decisions featuring the
successful use of multivariate methods in challenging causal hypotheses
about race and voter choice.' One leading case that did so was Solomon
v. Liberty County, which involved a challenge to the at-large election of
county commissiners and school board members in Liberty County,
Florida.' 6' The Eleventh Circuit, sitting en banc, split into two plurality
opinions consisting of five votes each. Chief Judge Tjoflat's concurring
opinion argued that even if the plaintiff in a section 2 vote dilution case
proves the three Gingles factors of geographical compactness, cohesion,
and racial bloc voting, the defendant may defeat the plaintiff's claim "by
demonstrating that the community is not driven by racial bias. ' ,, 6, Judge
Kravitch, writing for four other judges, rejected this approach on the
grounds that it would open up a divisive inquiry into whether the
community itself was motivated by racism. I6, She correctly argued that
the legislative history of the 1982 amendments to the Voting Rights Act
157. Id. at ioi.
158. See, e.g., Bernard Grofman, Multivariate Methods and the Analysis of Racially Polarized
Voting: Pitfalls in the Use of Social Science by the Courts, 72 Soc. Sci. Q. 826, 827-28 (1991).
159. The contention that plaintiffs in voting rights cases must establish that observed differences in
voting patterns are caused by race and that multiple regression analysis is the best means of proving
this fact has been endorsed by several jurists, including Judge Higginbotham in Jones v. City of
Lubbock, 727 F.2d 364, 381 (5th Cir. 1984) and Chief Judge Tjoflat in Solomon v. Liberty County, 899
F.2d 1012, 1035-36 (iith Cir. 199o). Although a handful of expert witnesses also have endorsed this
approach, most have rejected it. For further examples of experts on both sides of the controversy, see
generally Grofman, supra note 158.
16o. See, e.g., McCord v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 787 F.2d 1528, 1532 (ith Cir. 1986). For an
early discussion of this issue, see generally Charles Bullock, Racial Crossover Voting and the Election
of Black Officials, 46 J. POL. 238 (1984).
I6I. 899 F.2d at 1o3-14.
162. Id. at 1035.
163. Id. at ioi6 n.3.
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made it clear that it was precisely this prospect that Congress sought to
avoid by replacing the intent standard the Court used in Bolden with a
results test.' Chief Judge Tjoflat's argument to the contrary resembles
the defense used in the nineteenth century to sustain the literacy test
from attack under the Fifteenth Amendment: African-Americans were
excluded from the franchise not because of race but because of another
factor, such as illiteracy.
A second leading vote dilution decision that embraces Justice
O'Connor's position in Gingles is League of Latin American Citizens
(LULAC) v. Clement.'65 In LULAC, a group of Hispanic plaintiffs
challenged Texas's at-large system of electing state trial judges under• 66. ...
section 2. The Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc, ruled that plaintiffs
challenging an at-large voting system must meet the three Gingles factors
as "preconditions," and in addition, they must show, based upon the
Senate factors,' 67 that under the totality of the circumstances they do not
possess the same opportunities to participate in the political process and
elect representatives of their choice. 6s Judge Higginbotham, writing for
the six-member majority, argued that under the Supreme Court's
precedents,' 6, if the African-American community's lack of success at the
polls is the result of the normal operation of the political process, not
racial vote dilution, there is no ground for relief.'7° Judge Higginbotham
supported this conclusion with the following assertion: "Justice
O'Connor joined Justice White in maintaining that evidence that white
and minority voters generally supported different candidates did not
constitute legally significant racial bloc voting where these patterns were
attributable to partisan affiliation rather than the race of the
candidate."' 7' But while this statement correctly reports Justice
164- Id. (citing S. REP., supra note 79, at 36).
165. 999 F.2d 831 (5th Cir. 1993).
I66. Id. at 837-38.
167. See supra note 87 (listing Senate factors).
168. 999 F.2d at 849.
169. Id. at 851-54 (discussing White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (I973), and Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403
U.S. 124 (97I)). It is worth noting that the Supreme Court decided these cases under the Fourteenth
Amendment Equal Protection Clause. White, 412 U.S. at 763-64; Whitcomb, 403 U.S. at 16o.
170. The roots of Judge Higginbotham's approach in LULAC date back to Jones v. City of
Lubbock, 730 F.2d 233, 233 (5th Cir. 1984) (Higginbotham, J., concurring). There, he suggested that
racial bloc voting requires a showing of racial animus in the electorate as a whole. Id. This position
appears to be in direct opposition to that of Congress in adopting the 1982 amendments to the Voting
Rights Act, especially inasmuch as one of the reasons Congress rejected the intent requirement from
the Bolden decision was that "it was unnecessarily divisive because it involves charges of racism on the
part of individual officials or entire communities." S. REP., supra note 79, at 36.
171. LULAC, 999 F.2d at 856. In addition to partisanship, Judge Higginbotham suggested a list of
other legitimate factors that might cause white voters to withhold support from particular minority
candidates. Id. at 859. These include "limited campaign funds, inexperience, or a reputation
besmirched by scandal. Because these additional factors map only imperfectly onto partisan affiliation,
detailed multivariate analysis might then be the evidence of choice." Id.
November 2006]
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
O'Connor's position, it misstates the position of Justice White. At no
point did Justice White say that legally significant racial bloc voting
required proof that race, rather than partisanship, was the explanatory
force behind the African-American community's failure to elect its
preferred candidates. In effect, Judge Higginbotham read Justice
O'Connor's concurrence into a majority rule when in fact she wrote for
only four members of the Court.
Judge Higginbotham's opinion in LULAC also includes a discussion
of the social science evidence that plaintiffs must use to meet the new
partisanship defense.'72 Noting the need to determine the causal role that
race, partisanship, and other legitimate factors play in the electoral
process, he suggested a multivariate research design.'73 This statement
provoked a blistering attack from Judge King, who wrote in dissent.'74
Judge King correctly assailed the majority for misunderstanding the
nature of social science methods as they apply to voting rights cases, and
she made two arguments in support of this claim.'75 First, the additional
variables that Judge Higginbotham called for are themselves heavily
correlated with race, making multi-collinearity a serious and often fatal
concern."76 Second, as noted previously, multivariate methods only show
the correlation between multiple independent variables and a dependent
variable.'77 They emphatically do not show evidence of causation.' Nor
do they enable researchers to make comparative judgments about the
relative weight or importance that each of the independent variables
contributes in inducing change in the dependent variable.'79
Since the early 1990s, other circuits have adopted a variation of the
legal tests for vote dilution that were developed in Solomon and
LULAC. For purposes of the third prong of Gingles-racial bloc
voting-plaintiffs need only show a simple correlation between race and
political party preferences. But in order to satisfy their burden of proof
172. Id. at 859-61.
173. Id. at 859 ("Because these additional factors map only imperfectly onto partisan affiliation,
detailed multivariate analysis might then be the evidence of choice.").
174. Id. at 900-3 o .
175. ld. at 9ot.
176. Id. at 908. For further discussion of multi-collinearity problems, see supra Part I. Judge
Swygert of the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals expressed the problem of multi-collinearlity well in
a dissenting opinion in McCord v. Fort Lauderdale:
The additional factors that are commonly entered in a multivariate analysis of candidate
success such as campaign expenditures, education, income, media advertisement, religion,
name recognition, position of key issues-are also closely correlated to race. It is a safe bet
that blacks spend less on their campaign and on media advertisements because the
overwhelming majority of their contributors are black and poor.
787 F.2d 1528, 1535 (I ith Cir. 1986) (Swygert, J., dissenting), vacated, 804 F.2d 61i (11 th Cir. 1986) (en
banc).
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under section 2, they then must show that, based on the totality of the
circumstances, they have been unable to participate in the political
process and elect candidates of their choice on the basis of race. In this
portion of the case, they must counter any evidence the defendants have
brought forward concerning partisanship or other nonracial explanations
for the divergent racial voting patterns.' Significantly, however, none of
the other circuits have required plaintiffs to adopt a multivariate
statistical methodology, and none have required plaintiffs to prove that
racial bias in the community was an explanatory force behind the racial
bloc voting patterns.
Several aspects of these vote dilution cases are directly relevant to
vote denial cases challenging voting technology systems under section 2.
The first involves the concept of racial bloc voting, which is perhaps the
central issue in any vote dilution case. Racial bloc voting is to a vote
dilution case as racially divergent patterns of residual voting are to a
voting technology case: both concern the question of whether African-
Americans and non-African-Americans behave differently in the polling
place. Likewise, the same social science methodologies that are used to
test for the presence of racial bloc voting also are used to identify racial
disparities in residual voting. An additional similarity concerns the
totality of the circumstances test. Under Justice O'Connor's
interpretation of this test, defendants in vote dilution cases are free to
present evidence that nonracial factors are the proximate cause of the
plaintiffs' failure to elect their chosen candidates. Recently, this so-called
causation defense has appeared in prominent vote denial cases, and the
defendants in the Stewart voting technology case also utilized it as one of
their primary arguments. We now turn to an examination of the specific
nature of this defense.
D. THE CAUSATION DEFENSE IN VOTE DENIAL CASES
Although the Voting Rights Act prohibits voting practices that result
in the denial or abridgement of the right to vote "on account of race,"
several circuit courts in vote denial cases have held that statistical
evidence concerning the racially disproportionate impact of a neutral
18o. See, e.g., United States v. Charleston County, 365 F.3d 341, 344-53 (4 th Cir. 2004) (holding
causation to be irrelevant to the third Gingles factor of racial bloc voting, but relevant in the totality of
the circumstances once the Gingles factors have been satisfied); Uno v. City of Holyoke, 72 F.3d 973,
980 (iSt Cir. 1995) (finding that section 2 does not require courts to ignore evidence that factors other
than race are the real obstacles to the political success of a minority group).
Additionally, several courts have rejected Judge Higginbotham's position in LULAC that
analysis of why voters are racially polarized should be the focus of the third Gingles precondition, on
the grounds that his position would transform the threshold test into an overly-broad, wide-ranging
search for a racial animus in a given community. See, e.g., NAACP v. Thompson, i16 F.3d 1194 (7th
Cir. 1997); Lewis v. Alamance County, 99 F.3d 600, 615-616 n.I2 (4 th Cir. 1996); Sanchez v. Colorado,
97 F.3d 1303 (ioth Cir. 1996); Nipper v. Smith, 39 F.3d 1494, 1524-25 n.6o (I th Cir. 1994) (en banc).
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voting practice, in itself, does not constitute a violation of section 2.'8' In
addition to making this showing, these courts require the plaintiff to
establish that there is a causal connection between the challenged voting
practice and a prohibited discriminatory result."2 But there is significant
disagreement about what this requirement entails. Two leading voting
rights cases reflect this disagreement. In Ortiz v. Philadelphia, the federal
district court employed a "dispositive force" test to conclude that a
Pennsylvania voter purge statute was not the cause of disparate levels of
voter turn-out among African-American and non-African-American
voters.' The Pennsylvania voter purge law at issue there required voting
officials to remove voters from the registration rolls if they failed to vote
in a primary or general election during the preceding two years.' 84 Those
who were removed from the registration list had to re-register in order to
be eligible to vote again.'5 The plaintiffs challenged this statute under
section 2, citing statistical evidence that minority voters were purged at
higher rates than white voters.'" The defendants responded by arguing
that under the totality of the circumstances minority voters were not
denied the opportunity to participate in the political process and the
voter purge statute did not cause minority voters to have unequal access
to the political process or to fail to elect the candidates of their choice.' s
At trial, the plaintiffs argued that proof of causation was only
required in section 2 dilution cases and was inapposite in their episodic
vote denial action.8 8 They supported this position by noting the
legislative history of the 1982 amendments, in which Congress stated that
"[t]he courts have recognized that disproportionate educational,
employment, income level, and living conditions arising from past
discrimination tend to depress minority political participation" and
"where these conditions are shown, and where the level of [minority]
participation in politics is depressed, plaintiffs need not prove any further
causal nexus between their disparate socioeconomic status and the
181. See, e.g., Salas v. Sw. Tex. Junior Coll. Dist., 964 F.2d 1542, 1556 (5th Cir. 1992); Irby v.
Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 889 F.2d 1352, 1358-59 (4th Cir. 1989); Wesley v. Collins, 791 F.2d 1255,
1262 (6th Cit. 1986).
182. E.g., Ortiz v. Philadelphia, 28 F.3 d 306, 312 (3d Cit. 1994).
183. 824 F. Supp. 514,524 (E.D. Pa. 1993), affd 28 F.3d 306 (3d Cir. 1994).
184. Id. at 518-i9.
185. 25 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 623-40 (West 1994); Ortiz, 824 F. Supp. at 518. Subsequently, the
National Voter Registration Act of 1993 set federal standards concerning the purging of voters for
failure to vote in federal elections, and states were prohibited from removing individuals from the
official list of voters eligible to vote in federal elections by reason of a person's failure to vote. See 42
U.S.C. § 1973gg-6(b)(2) (2006).
i86. Ortiz, 824 F. Supp. at 518-I9. Several previous constitutional challenges against the voter
purge statute were unsuccessful. See, e.g., Brier v. Luger, 351 F. Supp. 313 (M.D.Pa. 1972); Williams v.
Osser, 350 F. Supp. 646 (E.D. Pa. 1972): Williams v. Osser, 326 F. Supp. 1139 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
187. Ortiz, 824 F. Supp. at 519.
I88. See id. at 524.
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depressed level of political participation."'"" The trial court rejected this
argument." It acknowledged that these socioeconomic factors would
have an impact on minority voter turnout, but it held that causation is a
necessary element in the plaintiffs' case under section 2."9' It then
phrased the causation requirement as follows:
[I]mplicit in any finding that a challenged electoral procedure violates
§ 2 is the conclusion that the electoral procedure is the dispositive force
depriving minorities of equal access to the political process, and that in
the absence of such a procedure, minorities would not be deprived of
equal access to the political process and the ability to elect their
candidates of choice.
The overall burden on the plaintiffs was to establish that "based upon the
totality of the circumstances, the challenged electoral procedure
interacted with social and historical conditions to deny minority voters
equal access to the political process and the ability to elect their
preferred candidates."'93 The trial court held that the plaintiffs failed to
meet their burden under section 2 because they failed to show that the
purge law was the dispositive force in depriving minority voters of the
right to participate in the political process.'" It noted that voter apathy,
rather than the purge law itself, was the primary factor leading to their
disenfranchisement, and the process for reinstatement was a relatively
simple matter of re-registering to vote.'95
A three-judge panel of the Third Circuit upheld the trial court's
opinion. 16 The majority noted that other circuits have required plaintiffs
to show a causal connection between the challenged voting practice and
a racially discriminatory result, and on the facts before the court this
showing was not made.'97 The court reasoned that although unequal
housing, education, and employment conditions may interact with the
purge law to yield racial disparities in the voters who are purged, these
conditions are not relevant because the voters in question already had
surmounted these adverse conditions in registering to vote in the first
instance. 9 The majority found no error in the district court's adoption of
the "dispositive force" test for causation, ruling that this phrase merely
meant "a cause which, [under the totality of the circumstances] would be
189. Id. at 525 (citing S. REP., supra note 79, at 29 n.I 14 (citing Kirksey v. Bd. of Supervisors, 554
F.2d 139, 145 (5th Cir. 1977) and White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755,768 (1973))).
19o. Id. at 524.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 526.
194. Id.
195- Id. at 539.
196. Ortiz v. Philadelphia, 28 F.3d 306,306 (3d Cir. 1994).
197. Id. at 310-11.
198. Id. at 314.
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legally dispositive." '99 Judge Lewis wrote a stinging dissent criticizing the
"dispositive force" test as inappropriate, given the statutory and case law
requirement that courts must determine whether the challenged law
interacts with social and historical conditions to deny minority voters
equal participation in the political process.2"
In contrast to the approach taken in Ortiz, the Ninth Circuit in
Farrakhan v. Washington adopted a significantly different test of
causation, this time in the context of a Washington felon
disenfranchisement statute.2°I Its inquiry looked beyond the impact of the
challenged voting program itself to require consideration of how racial
disparities in felony convictions may interact with the felon
disenfranchisement policy to yield racial differences in political
participation." '
In Farrakhan, plaintiffs challenged a provision of the Washington
Constitution that prohibits persons convicted of "infamous crime"-
crimes punishable by death or imprisonment in the state penitentiary-
from being eligible to vote until they have satisfied the terms of their
sentence and have their voting rights restored under a state statute.2 ° In
addition to making two constitutional claims, they alleged that the
Washington felon disenfranchisement policy represented vote denial and
vote dilution in violation of section 2 because racial minorities were
disproportionately disenfranchised. 4 The plaintiffs claimed that this was
due to racial disparities that permeated Washington's criminal justice
system. The district court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss for
failure to state a cause of action on the vote dilution claim.26 It ruled that
the plaintiffs had failed to allege facts that would establish the three
Gingles factors; it also noted that the Voting Rights Act requires
plaintiffs to show a causal link between the challenged voting procedure
and the discriminatory effect, based upon the totality of the
circumstances."° On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed, ruling that the
totality of the circumstances inquiry under section 2 requires plaintiffs to
show "how a challenged voting practice interacts with external factors
199. Id. at 313 n.It.
200. Id. at 323-25.
201. 338 F.3d oo9, 1011-12 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 984 (2004).
202. Id.
203. Jd. at 1012-13; see WASH. CoNsT. art. VI, § 3. The plaintiffs also challenged the statutory
process for restoring voting rights to felons who completed their sentences. Farrakhan, 338 F.3d at
1013. The original statute the plaintiffs attacked was codified as Washington Revised Code section
9.94A.22o; it later was amended and recodified as section 9.94A.637. See WASH. REV. COOE ANN.
§ 9.94A.637 (West 1988).
204. Farrakhan, 338 F.3d at 1013.
205. Id.
2o6. Farrakhan v. Locke, 987 F. Supp. 1304, 1313 (E.D. Wash. 1997).
207. Id.
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such as 'social and historical conditions' to result in the denial of the right
to vote on account of race or color.'2°s
The appellate court in Farrakhan criticized the trial court for failing
to determine if the challenged voting practice interacted with racial
discrimination external to the voting system in a meaningful way."° By
framing its responsibility narrowly and focusing only on the voting
practice itself, the trial court purportedly relied upon an approach used
in other circuits2 ' and a prior Ninth Circuit opinion in Smith v. Salt River
Project Agricultural Improvement & Power District."' In the Ninth
Circuit case, a three-judge panel rejected a section 2 challenge against an
Arizona policy that restricted the franchise in elections pertaining to a
water district to landowners." ' Plaintiffs had stipulated that there was no
evidence of racial discrimination in the water district's elections and
relied only upon statistical evidence of a racial disparity in the number of
persons who owned land in the district.213 But the court ruled that the
plaintiffs' own stipulations meant that there was no causal linkage
between the challenged voting practice and a prohibited discriminatory
result."4 The three-judge panel in Farrakhan distinguished Salt River
because of this stipulation and the reluctance of appellate courts to
disturb the factual findings of trial courts.2"5 It emphasized that adopting
a general rule that the challenged voting practice "by itself" must result
in voting discrimination is inconsistent with the "totality of the
circumstances" requirement that courts conduct a "broad and
functionally-focused review" to determine if the challenged voting
practice interacted with prior social and historical discrimination to cause
208. Farrakhan, 338 F.3d at 1011-12 (quoting Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 47 (1986)). Other
circuits have addressed the problem of felon disenfranchisement under section 2 in inconsistent ways.
See, e.g., Johnson v. Governor of Florida, 405 F.3d 1214 (1ith Cir. 2005) (en banc) (striking down
Florida felon disenfranchisement statute under section z would violate section 2 of the Fourteenth
Amendment of the United States Constitution), cert. denied, 126 S.Ct. 650 (2005); Baker v. Pataki, 85
F.3d 919 (2d Cir. 1996) (en banc) (5-5 decision) (addressing the question of whether disenfranchised
felons could state a claim under the Voting Rights Act); Wesley v. Collins, 791 F.2d 1255 (6th Cir.
1986) (holding that Tennessee felon disenfranchisement statute does not violate Voting Rights Act).
The Supreme Court has held that where racial bias is the motivation behind a legislature's decision to
adopt a felon disenfranchisement, a facially neutral felon disenfranchisement law violates the Equal
Protection Clause. Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 233 (1985).
209. Farrakhan, 338 F.3d at oI1-12.
210. See, e.g., Burton v. City of Belle Glade, 178 F.3d 1175, 1198 (iith Cir. i999) (denying tenants
claim that defendants' failure to annex a predominantly black housing project into the city violated
section 2). The court held that this evidence was insufficient to establish a violation of the Voting
Rights Act because "although Appellants have presented evidence of housing segregation in Belle
Glade and in the two centers, we can find no evidence of any discrimination with respect to voting."
Id.
211. io9 F.3d 586 (9th Cir. 1997).
212. Id. at 588.
213. Id. at590-9 I .
214. Farrakhan, 338 F-3d at 1011-12.
215. Id. at ioi8-20.
November 2006]
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
minority voters to be denied equal participation in the political process.'6
E. THE CAUSATION DEFENSE CONSIDERED
The question that emerges from the Ortiz and Farrakhan decisions is
straightforward: To what extent should the government be held
accountable under section 2 for employing facially neutral electoral
practices that exacerbate social and historical racial discrimination that
exists outside the electoral system but yields racially disparate electoral
effects? The approach taken in Ortiz restricts the scope of government
responsibility to situations in which the electoral practice itself generates
discriminatory effects. Moreover, the practice must be the exclusive, or at
least the principal, cause of those effects. Under this reasoning, if an
election policy or practice applies to voters of all races, it cannot be
viewed as the dispositive cause of any racially disparate results,
notwithstanding the fact that those results are predictable, or even
inevitable, in light of prior social and historical discrimination. The
"cause" of any discrimination will be attributable to factors extraneous to
the voting practice in question.
The approach taken by the court in Farrakhan provides a broader
test for the scope of government responsibility: If a facially neutral state
electoral practice either reflects or magnifies the effects of social and
historical discrimination outside the electoral system, it can trigger
liability under section 2 if it produces racially disparate effects. Because
African-Americans are overrepresented in the class of convicted felons,
the felon disenfranchisement rule has a racially disparate effect.
As a matter of pure logic, both of these approaches may well be
defensible. Absent any guidance from the express language of the statute
or any clear guidance from the legislative history,"7 a judge's choice
between them should be based on a determination of which option best
reflects the overall purposes of the statute. As we have seen, the
overriding purpose of the Voting Rights Act was to remove the taint of
racial discrimination from American elections as expeditiously as
216. Id.
217. The Ortiz majority's approach does have characteristics that might make it difficult to
reconcile with what everyone agrees was a central purpose of the 1982 amendments to the Voting
Rights Act. As the Ortiz majority noted, a major purpose of the amendments was to replace the
intentional discrimination requirement previously adopted by the Supreme Court with a test that
would recognize liability even where a plaintiff could not provide proof of intentional discrimination.
Ortiz v. Philadelphia, 28 F.3d 306, 309 (3d Cir. 1994). However, to the extent that the "dispositive"
effects analysis adopted by the majority requires a plaintiff to eliminate all other potential causes of
discrimination than the challenged practice itself, it begins to resemble the sort of "but for" causation
requirement the Supreme Court has imposed for proving purposeful discrimination in the context of
claims brought under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., Pers.
Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979). In other words, a requirement that a plaintiff exclude all
other causative factors for the discriminatory results but the challenged voting practice itself may be
tantamount to reinstating a standard that the amendments were enacted to eliminate.
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possible. Support for this proposition comes from the fact that Congress
defined the right to vote expansively to include the right to participate in
allphases of the electoral process," ' and its list of Senate factors included
a provision that expressly called upon courts to consider as relevant the
extent to which members of a minority group bore the effects of prior
discrimination in such areas as education, employment, or health that
hinder their ability to participate in the political process."9 Congress's
preference was for the state to be required to root out racial
discrimination that has electoral effects, even if the state, by adopting the
voting practice in question, has not directly caused the underlying
discrimination to take place.
The choice between these two models of causation will likely also be
influenced by other considerations. Included among these are judges'
views on such matters as race (including the proper scope of the state's
duty to eliminate racial discrimination in the electoral process),
federalism, deference to administrators, and the proper role of courts in
democratic governance. In this regard, we find illuminating a recent
essay by Professor Spencer Overton."' In commenting on Bush v. Gore,
Overton contrasts the theme of inclusion in the Florida Supreme Court's
presidential recount decision with the United States Supreme Court's
preference for a "merit-based" approach to political participation."' In
ordering a recount of the balloting in the disputed counties, the Florida
Supreme Court demanded that the government affirmatively remove a
known barrier to political participation.222 In contrast, the United States
Supreme Court majority, in overturning the Florida Supreme Court,
implied that the duty lies with the individual to ensure that his or her
ballot is completed in a manner that the automatic tabulating equipment
will be capable of reading."23
Professor Overton's distinction between inclusionary and merit-
based visions of democracy helps illuminate the consequences entailed in
218. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973l(c)(1). Section I4(c)(1) of the Voting Rights Act provides:
The terms "vote" or "voting" shall include all action necessary to make a vote effective in
any primary, special, or general election, including, but not limited to, registration, listing
pursuant to this Act, or other action required by law prerequisite to voting, casting a ballot,
and having such ballot counted properly and included in the appropriate totals of votes cast
with respect to candidates for public or party office and propositions for which votes are
received in an election.
Id.
219. S. REP., supra note 79, at 29.
220. See Spencer Overton, A Place at the Table: Bush v. Gore Through the Lens of Race, 29 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 469 (2001).
221. Id. at 472.
222. Id. at 475-76; see Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243 (Fla. 2000).
223. Overton, supra note 220, at 478; see Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104-05 (2000). As Professor
Overton and others have argued, the five Justices on the U.S. Supreme Court who voted to stop the
Florida recount have exhibited a pattern of departing from precedents that protected minorities and
other excluded groups in the political process. See, e.g., Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (993).
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adopting a strict causation standard for determining the proper meaning
of the "on account of race" requirement of section 2 of the Act. Here,
the Third Circuit Court of Appeals' decision in Ortiz is again instructive.
As noted earlier, the majority in Ortiz adopted a very restrictive theory
of causation."' It held that a section 2 claim of vote denial required the
plaintiffs, in order to successfully challenge a voter purge law, to show
not only that the challenged practice had racially discriminatory effects,
but that the practice was the "dispositive" cause of those effects.
According to this requirement, in addition to establishing that a
challenged voting practice resulted in actual racial discrimination-that
is, that the practice actually led to discriminatory results-a plaintiff
would have to establish that the practice was the exclusive, or at least the
primary, cause of the discrimination in question.
Such a requirement effectively incorporates into the Voting Rights
Act a merit-based conception of democratic politics. As Judge Lewis
noted in his Ortiz dissent, the majority's analysis seriously discounts and
even ignores the discrimination and disadvantages that minority voters
have experienced "in education, employment, health care, housing, and
income." '225 While the Senate Report established that "'where plaintiffs
can show socioeconomic disadvantage and discrimination along with
depressed rates of political participation, they need not prove any further
causal nexus, ' '.. 6 under the majority's strict causation standard such
factors become irrelevant. To the extent that minorities were
disproportionately purged from Pennsylvania's active voter lists, the fault
was theirs. They could have avoided the purge by either voting in the
previous two years, or by re-registering to vote. Since their failure to do
either of these things could not be attributable to the purge law itself, the
law could not be found to be the cause of their current
disenfranchisement.2 2 7
Judge Lewis argued that Pennsylvania's purge law operated in much
the same way as had literacy tests.22 8 Even though these laws were
racially neutral and evenly applied, they often led to the disproportionate
disenfranchisement of minority voters. They had been defended, in much
the same way that Pennsylvania sought to defend its purge law, as not
causing the resulting discrimination. States had argued that the
discriminatory effects of the literacy tests were directly attributable, not
to the laws that required them, but to the fact that minority voters were
more likely to not be sufficiently educated to pass the tests. These
224. See supra notes 182-99 and accompanying text.
225. Ortiz v. Philadelphia, 28 F.3d 306,327 (3d Cir. 1994).
226. Id. (quoting S. REP., supra note 79, at 29 n. 114).
227. See id. at 315-16.
228. Id. at 337.
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arguments, however, were ultimately rejected by the courts. '29
Judge Lewis went on to make a more telling point. By attributing the
discriminatory effects of the purge law to either the apathy or the
laziness of minority voters, the Ortiz majority risked succumbing to a
blame the victim mentality.3°  The presumed explanation for
disenfranchisement of purged voters was that they had "just lost interest
in political participation. 23' These voters "had the opportunity" to seek
reinstatement; "[t]hey simply did not take it. 232 And since, by the
majority's account, the process of re-registering to vote is such an "easy
thing to do," "[m]ass apathy, particularly among blacks and Latinos, is
the only explanation" for minority voter disenfranchisement. '33
Unfortunately for these would-be voters, however, "disinterest is not
actionable under the Voting Rights Act.
2 34
Judge Lewis's critique is compelling, and it anticipates Professor
Overton's analysis. The Ortiz majority's rigid causation requirement
reflects and embodies a merit-based vision of both voting rights and
democracy. When a breakdown in electoral processes can be attributed
either to the failure of an institution or policy or to the irresponsible
behavior of the voter, the latter will be presumed. If the state imposes
racially neutral conditions to the exercise of the franchise, and those
conditions seem merit-based and (to the judge's mind) objectively
reasonable, non-satisfaction of conditions will not be attributed to race
but to individual choices.235 While a more nuanced or contextual analysis
might shed light on social, economic, and cultural conditions that
contribute to electoral breakdowns, the "seemingly neutral, merit-based
qualifier.., avoids deeper and more difficult normative questions about




The Ortiz majority's strict causation requirement in section 2 actions
fails to account for, indeed it is inconsistent with, a central reason for
Congress's 1982 amendments to the Voting Rights Act-to ban voting
practices that have discriminatory effects. The merit-based conception of
voting rights it reflects minimizes, if it does not negate, the importance of
a voting practice's actual effects on the ability of minority voters to
effectively participate in the political process. To the extent that
229. See, e.g., Gaston County v. United States, 395 U.S. 285 (1969). See supra Part II.B.2 for
further discussion of literacy tests.
230. Ortiz, 28 F.3d at 338.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 340.
234. Id. at 338.
235. As Professor Overton notes, "A merit-based vision is individualist to the extent that an
individual citizen rather than the government has a responsibility to secure or meet the conditions
necessary for his or her political participation." Overton, supra note 220, at 476-77.
236. Id. at 479.
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performance of a voting practice requires a level of sophistication in a
voter's skill or experience, it is not unlikely that minority voters-whose
education and experience levels will often be less than non-minority
voters-will achieve lower levels of success.237 A focus on whether and
why particular voters acted the way they did, or whether the voting
practice itself was directly responsible for discrimination, may obscure
this fact. This theme also has arisen in voting technology cases, a topic to
which we now turn.
III. THE VOTING TECHNOLOGY CASES
As we noted earlier, one of the main criticisms that emerged from
the 2000 presidential election related to the alleged racial unfairness that
characterized the operation of voting equipment around the country.23
Chief among these concerns was the claim that voting equipment used in
Florida and elsewhere resulted in a disproportionate number of lost
votes in minority communities. Soon after the election, a number of
lawsuits were filed in which these disparities were challenged under
section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. 39
Most of these cases were settled before trial.24 However, in two
instances courts issued written opinions denying the state defendants'
motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim under section 2. In Black v.
237. It is, of course, not the case that every minority voter in every jurisdiction will be in a
disadvantaged position with respect to non-minority voters in terms of educational attainment, voting
experience, willingness to ask for voting assistance, and other factors that may be relevant to effective
electoral participation. But the Voting Rights Act itself acknowledges the possibility that this will
often be the case, and makes that possibility a factor that courts should take into account considering
claims under the Act. See supra note 87 and accompanying text (discussing the Senate factors, which
include consideration of such factors as whether minority groups have borne the effects of
discrimination in such areas as education).
238. See supra Part I.A.
239. See cases cited supra note 5. The first reported case of which we are aware in which the
Voting Rights Act was used to challenge punch card voting technology actually arose before 2000. In
Roberts v. Wamser, 679 F. Supp. 1513, 1514-16 (E.D. Mo. 1988), rev'd on other grounds, 883 F.2d 617
(8th Cir. 1989), an unsuccessful candidate for public office in St. Louis, Missouri complained that
"undercounted ballots" occured disproportionately in predominately African-American precincts and
local voting officials did not conduct visual inspections of such ballots to determine if computerized
tabulation equipment had malfunctioned. The plaintiff's expert used both homogeneous precinct and
ecological regression analysis to show that the punch card system had a disproportionate impact on
African-American voters. Id. at 1520. The trial court held that the three Gingles factors were
inapplicable to section 2 challenges that did not involve multi-member districts or redistricting, and it
conducted a thorough analysis of both the totality of the circumstances and the so-called Senate
factors. Id. at 153o-32. Its decision placed great weight on the extent of socioeconomic differences
between the races, patterns of racial appeals and racial bloc voting in St. Louis elections, and the
practical import of disenfranchisement on electoral outcomes and subsequent public policy. Id. The
court granted injunctive relief and ordered election officials to conduct hand-counts of uncounted
ballots in future elections, id. at 1532-33, but due to standing problems, this finding was reversed on
appeal, see Roberts v. Wamser, 883 F.2d 617, 618 (8th Cir. 1989).
240. See cases cited supra note 5 for a list of voting technology cases.
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McGuffage, African-American and Latino voters in Illinois argued that
they were disproportionately required to use unreliable punch card
voting systems in violation of section 2." ' The trial court held that the
plaintiffs had alleged sufficient facts to show that deficient ballot systems
constituted an electoral practice that gave minority voters less
opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the
political process and to elect representatives of their choice.242
In a similar challenge, this time in California, the trial court denied a
state motion to dismiss for judgment on the pleadings under section 2. In
Common Cause v. Jones, the state defendants argued that the plaintiffs
failed to satisfy the three-part test for violation of section 2 established in
Gingles.243 The district court held that while this test applies to
redistricting and vote dilution cases, it is inapposite in vote denial cases.2
Because voting technology challenges under section 2 more closely
resemble vote denial rather than redistricting cases, the Gingles test did
not apply, and the court denied the motion for judgment on the
pleadings.245
One year later, in Southwest Voter Registration Education Project v.
Shelley, minority plaintiffs unsuccessfully attempted to postpone a
gubernatorial recall election on the grounds that they were more likely
than whites to use unreliable punch card equipment26 The trial court
denied injunctive relief, in part because the plaintiffs could not
demonstrate a likelihood of probable success on their section 2 claim. 47
The court reasoned that the violation alleged in the plaintiffs' complaint
was not the type contemplated by section 2 of the Voting Rights Act,
since the complaint did not sufficiently allege violation of the "Senate
factors, '248 and therefore the plaintiffs lacked a probability of success on
the merits. 49 Although this decision initially was overturned on appeal,25°
the Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, affirmed the district court, finding that
the balance of the equities fell in favor of conducting the recall election
in a timely manner and that the plaintiffs' complaint, while raising close
questions on which reasonable minds could differ, did not demonstrate a
likelihood of probable success on the merits. 5 '
241. 209 F. Supp. 2d 889, 892-93 (N.D. Ill. 2002).
242. Id. at 899.
243. 213 F. Supp. 2d 1io6, 11o7-o8 (C.D. Cal. 2001).
244. Id. at 111o.
245. Id.
246. 344 F.3d 914, 918-I9 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc).
247. Sw. Voter Registration Educ. Project v. Shelley, 278 F. Supp. 2d 1131, 1142-43 (C.D. Cal.
2003).
248. See supra note 87 for further discussion of these factors.
249. Sw. Voter, 344 F.3d at 918-19.
250. Sw. Voter Registration Educ. Project v. Shelley, 344 F.3d 882 (9th Cir. 2003).
251. Sw. Voter Registration Educ. Project v. Shelley, 344 F.3d 914, 918 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc).
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To date, the only section 2 voting technology challenge that has
come to trial is Stewart v. Blackwell.52 There, African-American plaintiffs
from three urban counties in Ohio challenged the punch card voting
system on the grounds that minority voters were seven to nine times
more likely to cast invalid overvotes in the 2000 presidential election
than similarly situated non-African-American voters.253 The three urban
counties were Hamilton (the Cincinnati metropolitan area), Montgomery
(the Dayton metropolitan area), and Summit (the Akron metropolitan
area), all of which used the punch card voting system.254 A comparison
county (Franklin-the Columbus metropolitan area) that is
demographically similar to the other three counties used a DRE system
that prevented overvotes and warned voters when they were about to
cast undervotes.255 The crux of the plaintiffs' causation argument was that
the electronic voting equipment led to a substantial reduction in the
racial disparity in residual votes, particularly overvotes.25 6
Expert analysis of the data from the three punch card counties
revealed significant differences in overvoting, with African-Americans
casting more overvotes than non-African-Americans. 57 These differences
were eliminated in Franklin County, where voting occurs on electronic
machines that make it impossible to overvote. The results of the
ecological inference (El), ecological regression (ER), and homogeneous
precinct (HP) analyses are as follows:
In the course of its analysis, the en banc court stated, "The plaintiffs have made a stronger showing on
their Voting Rights Act claim" than on their constitutional claims. Id.
252. 356 F. Supp. 2d 791 (N.D. Ohio 2004), rev'd in part, 444 F.3d 843 (6th Cir. 2006).
253. Id. at 805-07.
254. Id. at 8u1.
255. Id. at 796. The four counties share similar demographic profiles. Their population ranges from
542,899 to I,o68,978; per capita income ranges from $21,743 to $24,053; educational attainment
(percent high school graduate or higher) ranges from 82.8% to 85.8%; and the percent of the voting
age population that is non-Hispanic Black ranges from 11.7% to 21.1%. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra
note 52.
256. Stewart, 356 F. Supp. 2d at 794-95.
257. Dr. Richard Engstrom of the University of New Orleans served as the expert for the plaintiffs
for purposes of the section 2 portion of their case. Id. at 793 n.3.
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TABLE ONE: ESTIMATES OF OVERVOTING BY RACE IN FOUR OHIO COUNTIES
PERCENTAGE OF PERCENTAGE OF
AFRICAN- NON-AFRICAN- DIFFERENCE (AA
AMERICAN AMERICAN MINUS NON-AA)
OVERVOTES OVERVOTES
HAMILTON COUNTY
El 2.48 0.43 2.05
ER 2.65 0.34 2.31
HP 3.04 0.43 2.61
SUMMIT COUNTY
E1 4.83 0.30 4-53
ER 2.88 0.39 2.49
HP 2.89 0.46 2.43
FRANKLIN COUNTY
Franklin County had no overvotes.
MONTGOMERY (analysis based on undervotes and overvotes)25
8
El 5-33 2.09 3.24
ER 5.54 2.08 3.46
HP 5.35 2.J8 3.17
Based on these calculations, the plaintiffs' expert concluded that
voting equipment matters when it comes to racial differences in the
number of overvotes and/or undervotes."9 The non-notice punch card
equipment used in Hamilton, Montgomery, and Summit Counties
consistently resulted in larger racial differences in over and/or
undervoting than did the notice electronic equipment used in Franklin
County."
To rebut these findings, the defendants relied on statewide data
from presidential, United States Senate, congressional, Ohio Senate, and
Ohio House of Representatives elections from 1992, 1996, and 2000."'
Because of frequent changes in precinct boundaries over this timeframe,
they used a geographical analysis based on wards, which on average
258. The Montgomery County Board of Elections did not conduct a separate analysis of overvotes
and undervotes by precinct. See Transcript of Record at 443-44, Stewart, 356 F. Supp. 2d 791 (No. 2)
[hereinafter Transcript of Record]. Therefore, these data represent residual votes instead.
259. Expert Report of Dr. Richard Engstrom at 1O, Stewart, 356 F. Supp. 2d 791 (No. 2).
260. Id.
261. Expert Report of Dr. John R. Lott at 5, Stewart, 356 F. Supp. 2d 791 (No. 2) [hereinafter
Expert Report of Lott].
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contain five precincts. 6 ' Their racial analysis was based on the "Top Ten
Percent" of wards by percentage of African-American population." The
defense expert 64 found that there were statistically significant differences
between the "Top Ten Percent African-American" wards and the "Top
Ten Percent White" wards in every one of the five electoral contests he
examined, except in the presidential elections. In addition, he found that
when both up-ballot and down-ballot electoral contests were examined,
all voters, including African-Americans, cast fewer non-votes on punch
cards than on any of the alternative electoral devices used in Ohio.
The trial court ruled for the defendants on the section 2 claim. 66 It
found that between seven and thirteen voters out of iooo using punch
cards accidentally failed to record a vote in the 2000 presidential election
and that this level, as a matter of law, was de minimis.2'6 Additionally, the
court ruled that the highest level of residual voting in Ohio was located
in counties with a very small African-American population, indicating
that residual voting is not race-oriented.28 The court concluded that
plaintiffs in voting rights cases must show that a state employs a "practice
or procedure" that results in the "actual" denial of the right to vote on
account of race.' 69 Under this test, it held that none of the African-
American plaintiffs was denied access to the polls, and none was denied
the opportunity to cast a valid vote because of race. 7 Therefore,
African-American voters had the same opportunity as whites to
participate in the electoral process, and they did not establish their vote
denial claim. 7'
The trial court's holding is grounded in two propositions. First,
because both black and white voters had equal access to the ballot, there
is no discrimination by race, notwithstanding the fact that the automated
tabulating equipment discarded more votes from black precincts than
white ones.272 Second, the court found that the highest levels of residual
voting statewide occurred in the nearly all white counties of Appalachian
Ohio, such that education and income, rather than race, were the
primary reasons for overvoting and undervoting in the 2000 presidential
262. Id. at 7-8; see also Transcript of Record, supra note 258, at 332 (No. 2), 547 (No. 3).
263. Expert Report of Lott, supra note 261, at 7.
264. Id. The defense expert was Dr. Lott of the American Enterprise Institute. Stewart, 356 F.
Supp. 2d at 793 n.3.
265. Expert Report of Lott, supra note 261, at 8.
266. Stewart, 356 F. Supp. 2d at 8o7-o8.
267. Id. at 8o6-o7.
268. Id. at 8o8, 821-22.
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election.73 This position closely resembles the argument used in Ortiz: a
factor outside the election system itself-such as voter apathy, illiteracy,
or simple voter stupidity274-is deemed to be the proximate cause of the
ostensible racial discrimination. Under the court's logic, despite the
resulting discriminatory effects, the fact that elections officials selected
punch card or other non-notice voting systems does not give rise to any
inference that they deliberately intended to exclude African-American
voters, nor does the state's choice lead directly to the disenfranchisement
of voters on the basis of race. Instead, the court concluded that residual
votes are excluded because voters have failed to follow directions, either
because they were careless or even functionally illiterate.75 The fact that
more blacks than whites have been unable to submit machine-readable
votes is a remote secondary outcome, not a primary effect, and therefore,
in accordance with the merit-based theory of elections law, there is no
basis for liability under the Act.
There are several flaws in this logic. First, equal access to the ballot
is not the same thing as equal participation in the franchise. Simply
handing a would-be voter a ballot and allowing him or her the
opportunity to vote does not eliminate the possibility that discrimination
can occur at a later stage in the vote-tabulating process. Second, the trial
court's argument concerning residual votes in the white rural counties
misses the mark. Educational and economic factors may well have
contributed to the high level of lost votes in the rural white counties, but
the plaintiffs' section 2 complaint did not challenge voting practices in
these counties. In the urban counties that were listed as party defendants,
racial disparities in education, employment, and income interacted with
punch card voting systems to yield racial disparities in voting
participation.
The third problem with the court's reasoning arises from its failure
to grasp the nuances of social science methodology. By accepting the
testimony of the defendants' expert that the level of residual votes
among black voters in Ohio was not statistically greater than that for
whites, the court found as a matter of fact that the punch card voting
system was not racially discriminatory. The methodology that the
273. Id. at 802, 822.
274. During the litigation, the trial judge in Stewart noted in open court that he personally "had
never had a problem with punch cards over many decades as a voter and office holder" and therefore
only "stupid" voters had difficulty with them. Transcript of Record, supra note 258, at 707 (No. 4), 527
(No. 3). Of course, since the judge was not present when his ballot card was tabulated, there is no basis
for this conclusion.
275. Scholars of residual voting and race have suggested several other explanations for the higher
incidence of residual votes among African-American voters than among whites. See, e.g., Overton,
supra note 220. These include higher levels of inexperienced or first-time voters, intimidation and




defendants' expert used to arrive at this conclusion was based on a "Top
Ten Percent of Wards by Percent Black" approach. However, selecting
wards as the unit of geography poses significant problems because wards
in Ohio, on average, are five times larger than precincts. Since wards are
likely to be more racially diffuse than precincts, they present a distorted
picture of voting behavior by race. As the plaintiffs' expert testified, the
average ward in Ohio is 5% African-American, whereas the average
precinct is io% African-American, and it is for this reason that
analyzing statistics on African-Americans on a geographic basis requires
the smallest possible level of aggregation. By focusing on the "Top Ten
Percent" of wards by African-American population, the court was
relying upon wards that were only 9.2% black as an appropriate means
of estimating the level of residual votes among black voters. Until now,
no federal court in the country has made findings of fact in a voting rights
case based upon such a flawed methodology.
Similar problems arose in the trial court's poor grasp of the research
design utilized by the parties' experts. As we noted earlier, the highly
technical and mathematical nature of the evidence most frequently
adduced in voting rights cases has often presented problems for lawyers
and judges."' The district judge in Stewart was apparently unable to grasp
the differences between cross-sectional and panel designs and the
meaning of core statistical concepts such as correlation and statistical
significance. In this sense, Stewart is a case study in the risks that litigants
in voting rights cases face when they rely upon social science
methodologies to assemble their cases. The court might have avoided
these risks by appointing a special master to provide guidance on these
matters, but it did not do so.
The final flaw in the trial court's opinion closely tracks the causation
issues we have examined in Part II.B of this Article. Demanding strict
proof of a causal relationship between the voting practice and racial
discrimination amounts to an intent requirement, an approach that
Congress squarely rejected in the 1982 amendments. The court's logic
discounts the role that social discrimination in education and
employment plays in preventing African-Americans from participating
effectively in elections that are conducted with punch card equipment.
The interest that is protected in the Voting Rights Act-equal
participation in the franchise for all Americans regardless of race or
ethnicity-is jeopardized when neutral electoral practices have the effect
of excluding racial minorities.
276. Transcript of Record, supra note 258, at 335-36 (No. 2). The mean percentage of African-
Americans in all precincts throughout the state is different than the mean level in wards because wards
are larger units of geography that contain more non-African-American residents. Id.
277. See supra Part IlB.
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In April of 2006, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
issued its opinion in Stewart v. Blackwell.27 The court held that Ohio
violated the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause by
employing various election technologies with substantially different
levels of accuracy.279 On the Voting Rights Act claim, it held that under
the statute, the state's responsibilities included not just granting plaintiffs
access to the polls, but "taking all actions necessary to make a vote
effective," including "casting a ballot and having such ballot counted
properly. '280 It further held that plaintiffs stated a claim under the Act
and that the trial court had made inadequate findings of fact under
sections 2(a) and 2(b) of the Act.' It therefore vacated the trial court's
opinion on this claim and remanded for further hearings."' The state and
county defendants sought en banc review, which the Court granted in
July of 2006.283
CONCLUSION
Recent section 2 cases reflect a tension between two philosophies of
discrimination, which scholars have identified as the merit-based and the
inclusiveness approaches. In this Article, we have argued that the
inclusiveness approach is more faithful to the purposes and legislative
history of the Voting Rights Act, and in particular the inclusion of an
effects standard in the 1982 amendments to section 2. Under this
standard, the selection and use of voting equipment that creates a racial
gap in lost votes would be actionable under section 2 since it represents a
facially-neutral voting practice that has the effect of discriminating on the
basis of race. The causal link between the voting practice and racial
discrimination can be shown by means of evidence from similar
jurisdictions that use notice voting equipment to reduce the racial gap
substantially. The alternative philosophy of meritocracy would deny the
existence of discrimination by blaming the problem of lost votes on the
negligence of the individual and overlooking the nexus between
socioeconomic discrimination and the failure of voters to submit a
machine-readable ballot. The flaw in this approach is that the strict
causation test is tantamount to a requirement of intentional
discrimination, even in the face of a congressional decision in favor of an
effects test.
The choice between these two philosophical approaches is not
278. 444 F.3d 843 (6th Cir. 2006).
279. Id. at 846.
28o, Id. at 862 n.i2 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 19731(c)(I) (2006)).
281. Id. at 878-79.
282. Id.




without stark political consequences: given the fact that African-
Americans overwhelmingly cast their votes for Democrats, Republican
legislative maorities may have disincentives to change the voting system
from within . It is in such circumstances that scholars have called for
heightened levels of judicial scrutiny to prevent political insiders from
disfavoring political outsiders.
This is not just a theoretical or hypothetical concern. In the past two
presidential elections, African-American voters have faced significant
barriers to their equal participation in the franchise, ranging from
documented instances of vote suppression in Florida in the 2000
election,"" to unreasonably long lines that discouraged turnout in many
inner-city precincts in Ohio in the 2004 election."7 Viewed in this context,
the adoption or continued use of voting equipment that clearly works to
the disadvantage of minorities is legally problematic, in part because it
could lead to increased levels of cynicism, apathy, and non-participation
among African-American voters. As a matter of both their individual
right to vote and their collective right to participate on an equal basis
with non-minorities in the political process, the rights of African-
American voters are under threat. The unfairness may not be equivalent
284. Although it may be argued that problems with the racial gap also can arise in states with
Democratic legislative majorities-who one would expect would be more sympathetic to the resulting
disenfranchisement of African-American voters-three out of four of the states that continue to have
the most protracted problems with punch card voting systems have Republican legislative majorities.
The four states in the country that relied most heavily on punch cards in the 2004 general election
were Illinois, Missouri, Ohio, and Utah. CAL TECH/MIT VOTING TECHNOLOGY PROJECT, MEASURING THE
IMPACT OF VOTING TECHNOLOGY ON RESIDUAL VOTE RATES 2 (2005), http://www.vote.caltech.edu/media/
documents/wps/vtp wp37.pdf. Of these, Missouri, Ohio, and Utah had Republican majorities in their
respective General Assemblies. See Missouri Senate, http://www.moga.mo.gov (last visited Oct. 20,
2006); Missouri House of Representatives, http://www.house.mo.gov (last visited Oct. 20, 2006); Ohio
Senate and House of Representatives, http://www.legislature.state.oh.us (last visited Oct. 20, 2006);
Utah Senate and House of Representatives, http://www.le.state.ut.us (last visited Oct. 20, 2006).
285. See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980);
see also Richard H. Pildes, The Constitutionalization of Democratic Politics- The Supreme Court, 2003
Term, I8 HARV. L. REV. 28, 41 (2004). Pildes argues that courts have done too little to make
politicians more accountable for structuring the political system in a way that entrenches their own
political power, yet judicial decisions are too restrictive in blocking the ability of democracies to
experiment with new political structures. Id. As Pildes expresses it, judicial decisions in this area of the
law do "too much-by inappropriately extending rights doctrines into the design of democratic
institutions-and too little-by declining to address self-entrenching laws aggressively enough." Id.
286. U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGTs, VOTING IRREGULARITIES IN FLORIDA DURING THE 2000
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION (2001).
287. For analysis and documentation of this problem, see DEMOCRATIC NAT'L COMM., DEMOCRACY
AT RISK: THE 2004 ELECTION IN OHIO (2005), www.democrats.org/a/2005/06/democracy-at-ri.php;
Walter Mebane, Timing and Turnout in Ohio, TOMPANE.COM, JULY 21, 2005, (2005),
http://www.tompaine.com/articles/2005/07/2i/timing-andturnout-inohio.php. For the U.S.
Department of Justice's contrary view, see Letter from John Tanner, Chief of Voting Section, U.S.
Dept. of Justice, Civil Rights Division, to Nick A. Soulas, Jr., Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Civil
Division, Franklin County (June 28, 2005), available at www.usdoj.gov/crt/voting/misc/
franklin-oh.htm.
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to that of the literacy test, but in certain respects the problems are
analogous.
In the fall of 2002, Congress responded to the problems of the 2000
presidential election by enacting the Help America Vote Act (HAVA).28B
HAVA provides federal resources for the replacement of punch card and
other non-notice forms of voting technology."9 But the Act erects no
federal mandate for the use of uniform voting equipment and instead
allows the states to determine which type of voting equipment to use and
whether punch card equipment should be retired.2"
There are several reasons to be skeptical about HAVA's potential to
reduce the need for judicial involvement in this area of election law.29'
First, the fact that states have discretion to choose their own forms of
voting technology means that both punch cards and the racial gap in lost
votes may persist indefinitely.29 A review of HAVA State Action Plans
reveals that only eight of the fifty-one electoral jurisdictions in the
United States are planning to use uniform voting technology,93 and of
the eleven jurisdictions that relied most heavily on punch cards in the
2ooo election, four have stopped short of abolishing punch cards and
non-notice voting systems.94 Second, it remains unclear if local
288. 42 U.S.C. §§ 15301-15545 (2005).
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. That the racial gap associated with dual balloting systems is likely to continue beyond January
I, 2oo6, the date set by HAVA for replacement of punch cards under Title I of the Act, is illustrated
by recent developments in New York. Due to apparent political and administrative disagreements
among state election officials, New York missed the January I HAVA deadline. See James T. Madore,
A Vote for Status Quo: New York Scraps Updating Voting Machines, Now Scrambles to Save Federal
Funds at Risk after Deadline Passes, NEWSDAY, Feb. 22, 2006, at A3; Editorial, Democracy Runs Late,
STAR-GAZETrE, Feb. 22, 2006, at 6. As of this writing, the state's Board of Elections has not decided
which voting equipment county election officials will have to choose from. Thus, many, if not most,
New York voters voted in the September 2006 primary election and will vote in the November general
election on the same equipment that has been in place for decades. Id.
292. HAVA expressly empowers the states to continue using punch cards and other non-notice
types of voting equipment indefinitely, as long as warnings are provided to voters in the polling place
concerning the proper operation of the voting devices and the consequences of overvoting and
undervoting. 42 U.S.C. § 15481(a)(t)(B)(i)-(ii) (2006).
293. See BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE, N.Y. UNIV. SCHOOL OF LAW, HAVA IMPLEMENTATION IN
THE 50 STATES: A SUMMARY OF STATE IMPLEMENTATION PLANS 55-59 (2005).
294. These eleven jurisdictions are Arizona, California, Washington, D.C., Florida, Illinois,
Indiana, Missouri, Nevada, Ohio, Utah, and Washington. See TODD ROKITA, OFFICE OF THE SEC'Y OF
STATE, A BLUEPRINT FOR INDIANA ELECTIONS 29-30 (2005). Of these, Indiana has prohibited the use of
lever machines and punch cards after December 31, 2005. Id. However, it has allocated only $8ooo per
precinct for the purchase of replacement technology, and it will disburse the funds on a first come, first
served basis. Id. Missouri is not requiring its counties to participate in the punch card replacement
program. See ROBIN CARNAHAN, OFFICE OF THE SEC'Y OF STATE, HAVA: MISSOURI'S STATE PLAN 38
(2oo5). Likewise, Ohio has not decertified punch cards, and it has not issued any regulations or
legislation requiring local jurisdictions to participate in the punch card replacement program. See J.
KENNETH BLACKWELL, OFFICE OF THE SEC'Y OF STATE, CHANGING THE ELECTION LANDSCAPE IN THE
STATE OF OHIO 13-14 (2005). Washington is continuing to use mail-in ballots, which will not eliminate
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jurisdictions will have sufficient funds to eliminate non-notice voting
systems entirely. Apart from the cost of the voting equipment itself,
significant local resources will be needed for storage, training, and (for
optical scan equipment) paper ballots. It is foreseeable that funding
shortages may force a delay in the (optional) deadline for replacement of
punch cards under Title I of the Act.295 Alternatively, election officials
may opt to return federal funds or simply reduce the number of voting
machines at each polling place, a practice that led to problems in Ohio in
the 2004 election when disproportionate numbers of African-American
voters encountered unreasonably long lines and opted to leave.
Given the Supreme Court's preference for meritocracy and its
willingness to cast aside longstanding voting rights precedents,29 6 several
scholars have expressed skepticism about the desirability and the need
for an active judicial role in the voting rights arena. They have called
instead for legislative initiatives." Yet, as Congress's latest foray into
voting technology reform indicates, the legislative arena also may be of
limited utility. Under these circumstances, it is at best unclear whether
the legislative process will provide a better alternative for would-be
African-American voters, and the best course may be to pursue both
judicial and legislative remedies simultaneously.
Be this as it may, it is undeniable that the racial gap in lost votes
represents a significant threat to the integrity of the democratic process.
Not only is it an overt form of vote denial that is related to the history of
discrimination in the fields of education and employment, but it also has
the effect of blocking equal participation in the electoral process on the
basis of race. This is true for several reasons. First, on an individual level,
would-be voters suffer utter disenfranchisement, albeit under
circumstances that take place outside their presence and direct personal
knowledge. Second, as a matter of collective voting rights, the racial gap
reinforces the perception that white majorities ignore the political
preferences of racial minorities, a realization that deepens the risk of
the potential for residual voting. See SAM REED, OFFICE OF THE SEC'Y OF STATE, ENSURING A TRADITION
OF INDEPENDENCE: WASHINGTON STATE PLAN 6-7 (2003).
295. Funding shortages for HAVA-based election reforms have already led to controversy in a
number of jurisdictions. For one example of this problem, see Doug Staley, High-Tech Voting Too
Costly, THE INDEPENDENT (Massillon, Ohio), Feb. 25, 2005, at 1 (describing how start-up costs for
implementing precinct-count optical scan system for moderate sized Ohio county will be $300,000, and
these funds will not be covered by HAVA).
296. For an example of the Rehnquist Court's break with voting rights precedents, see Shaw v.
Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993). For scholarly discussion of this point, see Richard Briffault, Bush v. Gore
as an Equal Protection Case, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 325, 347-49, 372 (2001); Hasen, supra note 140, at
38o (Bush v. Gore's break from past cases may "ease the way for future Supreme Court majorities to
pursue their own visions of political equality without much thought about whether that vision is
supported by existing case law"). See generally RICHARD L. HASEN, THE SUPREME COURT AND ELECTION
LAW: JUDGING EQUALITY FROM BAKER V. CARR TO BUSH v. GORE (2003).
297. See, e.g., HASEN, supra note 296; Pildes, supra note 285.
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alienation, frustration, and political cynicism.29 Finally, at the level of
democratic political theory, the racial gap squarely presents the problem
of illegitimacy in the electoral process, regardless of how elections
actually turn out. If the number of residual votes is smaller than the
difference between the leading candidates, discarding such votes still
interferes with the communications function of the electoral process, and
political elites will not receive an accurate picture of where their
constituents stand. On the other hand, if the number of residual votes
does exceed the difference between the leading candidates, the outcome
of an election could, and probably will, be thrown into the courts.
As a matter of legal theory, the racial gap in lost votes can be
interpreted as a violation of the anti-caste principle." Briefly, this
principle states that the concept of discrimination should include not only
intentional acts of disparate treatment but also policies that "turn[ I
highly visible but morally irrelevant differences into a basis for second-
class citizenship."3" Because punch card voting technology yields a racial
gap in lost votes, it saddles minority groups with social disadvantages that
relegate them to the status of a subject race and discourages them from
participating in core political activities, here the franchise itself. The
implied social message is that it is legitimate for the disproportionate risk
of lost votes to fall on black shoulders, whereas such risks may be
regarded as intolerable if they had a similar effect on whites. While
skeptics may respond that conceiving of discrimination on the basis of
effects such as these is an inherently vague enterprise that only invites an
activist judiciary to intrude upon the policy preferences of the political
branches, this is precisely what Congress intended when it adopted the
1982 amendments to the Voting Rights Act.
298. The plaintiffs in Stewart were no strangers to these frustrations. Several were veterans of the
struggle to gain voting rights in Mississippi during the i96os, and it troubled them to learn that the
problem of lost votes was most acute in heavily African-American inner-city precincts.
299. Cass R. Sunstein, The Anti-Caste Principle, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2410, 2449-51 (i994); see also
David A. Strauss, Discriminatory Intent and the Taming of Brown, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 935, 943-44
(1989).
300. Sunstein, supra note 299, at 2455.
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METHODOLOGICAL APPENDIX: ESTIMATING VOTING BEHAVIOR BY RACE3"'
Social scientists use three primary methods to estimate voting
behavior by race: homogeneous precinct analysis, ecological regression,
and ecological inference. Each of these methodologies rests on certain
assumptions. Homogeneous precinct analysis assumes that turnout is
constant by race and that voting behavior in relatively segregated
neighborhoods does not differ from that in more integrated
neighborhoods. Because ecological regression incorporates data from all
parts of a jurisdiction, it avoids the problem of exclusive reliance on
heavily-segregated areas. But ecological regression retains the
assumption that turnout is constant across the jurisdiction. In addition, it
makes a "constancy assumption" that estimation errors are randomly
allocated across every precinct or county under examination. In other
words, it assumes that people in every jurisdiction vote in the same
pattern and that any small departures from this pattern are random and
balance each other out."' Occasionally, ecological regression also can
produce impossible findings, such as an estimate that iio% of African-
American voters in a given place supported the Democratic candidate.
This is known in the literature as an "out of bounds" estimate, and it
arises when independent variables are highly inter-correlated. While this
phenomenon is not frequent, it can lead to big headaches in expert
301. The authors wish to acknowledge their debt to J. Morgan Kousser, Bernard Grofman,
Richard Engstrom, and J. Stephen Voss, whose publications, workshops, and presentations have
helped us to understand the King procedure.
302. For further discussion of this point, see J. Morgan Kousser, Ecological Inference from
Goodman to King, 34 HISTORICAL METHODS 1OI (2001). Critics of simple ecological regression
introduced a "neighborhood model" to challenge the assumption that one could validly infer
individual behavior from aggregate data. Id. at 05--o6. The neighborhood model takes two forms.
Non-linear models assume there is no relationship between race and voting behavior at the individual
level but that these variables are highly correlated at a group level. Id. at Io6. In other words, for a
given county, all racial groups are assumed to have voted the same way: if 52% of the voters in the
county voted Democratic, then both blacks and whites residing there also are presumed to have voted
52% Democratic. As Kousser persuasively argues, this model unreasonably makes the a priori
assumption that socioeconomic variables are irrelevant to voting behavior at both the individual and
aggregate level and then sets out to prove that no correlation exists between ethnicity and politics. Id.
One advocate of this approach, David A. Freedman, used it as an expert witness for the defendants in
Garza v. Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors, 918 F.2d 763 (9th Cir. 199O), in an attempt to
prove that survey research is the only reliable and valid way to draw conclusions about race and voting
behavior. But in Garza, both the district court and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected this
approach. 918 F.2d at 773. The second model is known as the bivariate linear neighborhood model.
Kousser, supra, at to6. It also assumes that voters of both races take on the voting preferences of the
majority in their particular neighborhood. Id. Whites residing in precincts that are majority black vote
identically to blacks, and blacks residing in precincts that are majority white vote the same way their
white neighbors do. Id. Thus, while the non-linear model assumes that there is no relationship between
ethnicity and voting, the bivariate linear model assumes that these variables are strongly correlated.
Advocates of the bivariate neighborhood model use it to argue that alternative models, such as those
based on ecological regression, do no better at estimating individual behavior from aggregate data,
again to raise an inference that survey research is the superior technique.
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testimony at trial. Researchers solve it by setting the estimates at their
boundary points and adjusting the other variables accordingly.3" More
sophisticated versions of ecological regression enable researchers to
adjust for aggregation bias by weighting the data by population,
examining scatterplots of the data and (if necessary) adding dummy
variables,3 4 and comparing the percentage of the variance that different
versions of the research model explain.3"5
The ecological inference methodology is a more recent approach,
associated with the scholarship of Gary King. Instead of assuming that
the variables of interest interact in a linear fashion, the King approach
operates by means of a bivariate normal curve, which is "truncated" so
that the data do not exceed logical bounds (thus assuring that iio% of
African-Americans in precinct X could never be listed as having voted
Democrat). To illustrate the King procedure, assume that all precincts in
a county are the unit of analysis, and the object is to estimate support for
each political party by race. According to the King approach, the
relationship between each precinct takes the form of a truncated
bivariate normal distribution, similar to a three-dimensional bell curve.
In stage one of the King procedure, the contours of this curve are drawn,
based on the number of voters in each precinct and the percentage of
African-Americans and non-African-Americans in the voting age
population. The result is an estimate of voter turnout in each precinct by
race. In the second stage, election data, such as the level of support for
each candidate, is added to the truncated distribution, yielding a "bounds
plot" that represents the minimum and maximum possible percentages of
votes African-Americans and non-African-Americans could have given
to each party in every precinct. Many random samples are drawn from
each bounds line, based on the distribution curve, and each becomes a
point estimate on the bounds line. The mean of all these point estimates
represents the estimated percentage of support for one of the political
parties by African-Americans in that precinct. This process takes place
for every precinct in the county, and then the precinct means are
weighted to arrive at a countywide estimate. The same process then takes
place for non-African-Americans. The end result is a series of
"tomography lines" that resemble the ultrasound procedure used in
medicine to estimate the contours of a fetus or tumor that is not visible to
303. See Kousser, supra note 302, at 1 i6.
304. The term "dummy variables" refers to dichotomous or categorical variables-such as religion
or region of residence-that are transformed into binary form for purposes of regression analysis so
that they can only take on the value of o or I. For example, all Catholics in a sample survey might be
coded as I, and those of any other religion would be coded as o. FIELD, supra note 66, at 208.
305. In order to insure that the independent variables are related to the dependent variable in a
linear fashion, researchers visually examine the covariation between the two variables using a set of
points on a graph known as a scatterplot. Id. at 78-8o, I13. If the relationship is not linear, the
independent variables must be transformed, for example by taking the natural log of their values. Id.
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the naked eye. A tomography plot of all the bounds lines for all precincts
in the county indicates where most of the bounds lines intersect, which
facilitates the computation of the mode and 50% and 95% confidence
intervals. Depending on the shape of the contours, the bound lines either
constrain the estimate of political behavior by race, making it possible to
arrive at a relatively accurate estimate, or they are so scattered that they
yield relatively imprecise estimates. °6
In many respects, ecological inference is superior to the other
approaches because it does not make a constancy assumption about both
voter turnout and voting behavior by race. According to King, ecological
inference is largely successful in overcoming two other problems,
aggregation bias and compression, but other scholars are divided about
this claim.3" For his part, King lists three primary conditions that the data
must meet in order to be analyzed under the ecological inference
technique: the bivariate distribution must be truncated normal, there can
be no aggregation bias to which ecological inference is not robust, and all
observations must be spatially dependent. As a practical matter, this
means that ecological inference works well when the group under study
is a numerical majority or is relatively segregated across geographical
units, when the attributes or phenomena under study approach
unanimity in at least some discrete geographical units, when there are
many cases under observation, when the group of interest constitutes a
distinct population that exhibits similar behavior in contrast to other
groups, and when the researcher knows enough about the subject matter
to guard against fallacious conclusions.3
Although expert witnesses in many vote dilution cases have used
one or more of these methods to test for racially polarized voting,3" and
countless academic studies similarly rely on them,10 at least one set of
306. For more detailed treatment of the King procedure, see GARY KING, A SOLUTION TO THE
ECOLOGICAL INFERENCE PROBLEM: RECONSTRUCTING INDIVIDUAL BEHAVIOR FROM AGGREGATE DATA
(1997); Kousser, supra note 302; BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, N.Y. UNIV. SCH. OF LAW, THE REAL Y2K
PROBLEM: CENSUS 2OOO DATA AND REDISTRICTING TECHNOLOGY (Nathaniel Persily ed., 2000).
307. See David A. Freedman et al., Response to King's Comment, 94 J. AM. STAT. ASS'N 355 (1999);
Kousser, supra note 302. See generally Wendy K. Tam Cho & Albert H. Yoon, Strange Bedfellows:
Politics, Courts, and Statistics: Statistical Expert Testimony in Voting Rights Cases, 1O CORNELL J. LAW
& PUB. POL'Y 237 (2001); Wendy K. Tam Cho, If the Assumption Fits... A Comment on the King
Ecological Inference Solution, 7 POL. ANALYSIS 143 (1998).
308. For further discussion of these issues, see D. Stephen Voss, Using Ecological Inference for
Contextual Research: When Aggregation Bias Is the Solution as Well as the Problem, in ECOLOGICAL
INFERENCE: NEW METHODOLOGICAL STRATEGIES (Gary King et al. eds., 2003).
309. See, e.g., Mallory v. Ohio, 173 F.3d 377, 383-84 (6th Cir. 1999) (using ecological inference);
Sanchez v. Colorado, 97 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Ioth Cir. 1996) (using homogeneous precinct and ecological
regression analysis); Solomon v. Liberty County, 899 F.2d 1012, ioi9 (iith Cir. 199o) (en banc) (using
homogeneous precinct analysis).
310. One example of a major academic work that includes several of the techniques described here
is KOUSSER, supra note 13 1.
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scholars has challenged their applicability to residual voting analysis. In
their study on residual voting in Los Angeles County, D.E. "Betsy"
Sinclair and R. Michael Alvarez argue that both overvoting and
undervoting counts have a lower bound of zero and are not continuously
distributed."' In addition, there is rightward skewness and overdispersion
in the data."' In view of these considerations, Sinclair and Alvarez used a
negative binomial regression model, and due to the nonlinear nature of
their data, they transformed the coefficients into "incidence risk ratios,"
which can be interpreted as multiple regression coefficients that show the
effect of a one-unit change in an independent variable on the dependent
variable.3 At root, however, this approach constitutes a modified form
of ecological regression analysis, with many of its attendant assumptions.
Moreover, when these various statistical approaches are applied to the
same dataset, they often yield very similar estimates of the variables of
interest. Accordingly, the best strategy may be to use multiple measures
and "triangulate" between them to ascertain whether they all run
consistently in the same direction, an approach that was used by expert
witnesses in the Stewart case.
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